On the 20th anniversary of the start of Georgia’s war against Abkhazia, by Stanislav Lakoba

Friday, 21 September 2012 08:17

[Regarding] the former Minister of Defence of Georgia: on the war and the situation concerning Abkhazia (1992-1993 years). At one time, the poet Nikolaj Glazkov very aptly said of the twentieth century: I gaze at the world from under the table, The twentieth century - the century of the extraordinary. A century of interest to the historian for the same reason That it is sorrowful for anyone living it! So today one remembers the events of what is already in the past, the 20th century, when on the space of the former Soviet Union there broke out wars, conflicts, and clashes ... One of the bloodiest events of the century was the war unleashed by Georgia against Abkhazia. The Tbilisi authorities have tried to blame the leadership of our country for what happened. Shevardnadze from the start began inventing various reasons, versions, causes for why the State Council’s troops invaded Abkhazia, hinting that his Defence Minister, T. Kitovani, was to blame for this. However, the testimones of many Georgian military and political activists speak of the beginning of the war as the private initiative principally of Shevardnadze. Sufficiently weighty grounds have been adduced in the reminiscences of such generals as Z. Mamulashvili, G. Lominadze and others, which have been repeatedly cited by Abkhazian politicians and historians. Well, in 2006, it came to my knowledge that there had been published in Tbilisi as something like a "samizdat"-publication with a miserly print-run a small booklet entitled "Notes of a commando-commissar". The author was one of the closest people to Shevardnadze, General Levan Sharashenidze, who from January to May 1992 headed the Ministry of Defence of Georgia. During this period, he repeatedly travelled to Sukhum and held negotiations with Vladislav Ardzinba. The memoirs of General L. Sharashenidze can be described as a precious source, since he places concentrates totally on this military adventure and names the main culprit of the war unleashed in 1992. Here's what he wrote about the events on the eve of the invasion: "... E. A. Shevardnadze during this period did not once meet V. G. Ardzinba, although he had agreed to a meeting, even after his arrival in Tbilisi. I had several meetings with Ardzinba, and I confirm this as well as the fact that the Abkhazian leadership at that time endorsed the return of Eduard Shevardnadze to Georgia and held out some hopes in it. In any case, Shevardnadze himself could and should have held negotiations with the Abkhazian leadership, [but] for some reason he extemporised and made his meeting dependent on certain conditions. During this period, May-June 1992, I met Ardzinba four times and certify the accuracy of all of the above. After each meeting, I debriefed Shevardnadze in great detail, including on the readiness of Ardzinba to meet him." [1] Apparently, such a minister-peacemaker was not what those times required, and he was replaced in May 1992 by the criminal Tengiz Kitovani. It is obvious that Shevardnadze, with his delusions of grandeur, had made his choice of scenario -- a military solution to the Abkhazian problem. At the same time, he even so still feared the reaction of Moscow, as he wished, figuratively speaking, to enter into Abkhazia, without entering the CIS. And Georgia’s joining the CIS was the main condition for the return of Shevardnadze to Tbilisi, where he could go back, with the military and political support of the Kremlin. As head of the State Council of Georgia, Shevardnadze began to manoeuvre and drag out the question of joining the CIS. His then-deputy, Dzh. Ioseliani, in response to the obstinacy of his boss with regard to the CIS, prophetically remarked: "If Moscow sneezes, we get double pneumonia. What are you up to?" Shevardnadze replied: "First it’s necessary to deal with Abkhazia". [2] It is interesting to note that the opinion L. Sharashenidze on the invasion of Abkhazia was essentially confirmed by the Georgian historian Z. Papaskiri. He criticizes the actions of Eduard Shevardnadze in sending troops to Abkhazia, where "the situation was extremely tense" and "the Georgian government should have acted with maximum caution." Later Z. Papaskiri writes: "What do we have in mind? In our opinion, the Head of State should not have been content with just telephone-conversations with Ardzinba. He should himself have gone to Sukhum, met him in person and received from him ... formal approval for the introduction of units of the Republic of Georgia into Abkhazia. Unfortunately, however, none of this was done; clearly, Shevardnadze’s political instincts let him down, and he did not take what was, of course, by the standards of those times, such an extraordinary step." [3] His laconic assessment of the war-events is given by General L. Sharashenidze thus: "The entry into Abkhazia began on 14 August,” he writes, “but E. A. Shevardnadze, a politician and diplomat of such a high standing, who arrived [sc. in Tbilisi] on 7 March, was unable, during more than five months, to prevent the war. This unprepared, not properly provisioned entry was, of course, undertaken with the consent of Eduard Shevardnadze, from which he later distanced himself." [4] All these adventurous activities of Shevardnadze were a reflection of other, deeper geopolitical processes, which General L. Sharashenidze mentions in passing. The main issue for Georgia in early 1992, continued to be the issue of joining the CIS. It was a sort of a test for Shevardnadze. Of course, he promised Moscow positively to solve the problem, and, on 7 March 1992, he arrived in Tbilisi. This was preceded by important events. In January and February the Minister of Defence of Georgia, L. Sharashenidze, twice met Shevardnadze in Moscow. By this time in Russia and Georgia the choice had already been made in his favour. Thus, on 14 February 1992 there took place in Minsk the second meeting between the heads of state and governments of the CIS countries. The Georgian delegation was headed by L. Sharashenidze, who overnight agreed the text of his speech by phone with Shevardnadze. "He approved it and asked that after the summit I travel to Moscow to meet him," writes the then-Minister of Defence. In his 3-minute speech in Minsk, L. Sharashenidze, in part, declared: "The question of Georgia's entry into the CIS will be decided by parliament upon its election. “I want to report that we are restoring good relations with the Transcaucasian Military District troops on the territory of Georgia. We have removed from them the status of a force of occupation. Naturally, we reserve the right to participate in the discussion of all matters relating to the Army and the Black Sea Fleet. “We would request in the future an invitation to meetings of the CIS for the relevant leaders of Georgia by way of observers." [5] It should be noted that the representatives of Georgia wittingly or unwittingly misled the Russian leadership and talked about the participation of leaders of Georgia in the CIS only as observers. On his return from Minsk, L. Sharashenidze met Shevardnadze in Moscow and reported to him in detail on the summit of the CIS. Then another meeting was scheduled where the question of his return to Georgia was to be decided. [6] In February 1992, in parallel with the summit of the CIS, there arrived in Sukhum a detachment of the National Guard of Georgia, under the command of Captain G. Karkarashvili, accompanied by several armoured vehicles. The Supreme Council of Abkhazia (including Georgian deputies, supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia) almost unanimously demanded that this detachment leave the territory of the republic forthwith. The anger of the government and multi-ethnic population of Abkhazia was caused in particular by the transfer of weapons and several units of the BMP Assault Battalion Airborne-troops of Russia, which had been placed in Sukhum (in the district of Majak [Lighthouse]) shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. [7] Today it is clear that all this took place against the background of the Minsk summit of the CIS, and the Russian leadership decided to show Georgia some "carrot" in the form of several BMPs. Under the February agreements, on 2 March in Moscow there were very important meetings with Shevardnadze. The negotiations were carried out by Defence Minister L. Sharashenidze and T. Kitovani, a member of the Military Council of Georgia, who, along with Prime Minister T. Sigua and unlike Dzh. Ioseliani, were not eager to invite the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to Georgia as head of state. However, the situation changed after a five-hour conversation between Shevardnadze and Kitovani. Then a two-hour interview took place with the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the CIS, E. Shaposhnikov, and the Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Vladimir Lukin. Another meeting was held with the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, E. Primakov. To all these people Shevardnadze gave a firm promise to join the CIS in the near future. In fact, this was the main condition lay down by the Russian leadership on Shevardnadze. A participant in these important negotiations in Moscow on 2 March 1992, Georgian Defence Minister L. Sharashenidze disappointedly later noted: "These talks foreshadowed many positive changes in Russian-Georgian relations. Unfortunately, the reality turned out to be different. “On 7 March, E. A. Shevardnadze arrived in Tbilisi. On arrival, he stressed in his statements that Georgia would follow a pro-Western course, that the emphasis in foreign policy would be, above all, predicated on a strategic partnership with the United States, and that Georgia would not join the CIS. It is not hard to imagine what kind of reaction this had in Russia and the other CIS countries," [8] L.Sharashenidze rightly concludes. In late March 1992, the Minister of Defence of Georgia met in the Kremlin the vice-president of Russia, A. Rutskim, and then Navy Commander Col. Gen. E. Podkolzinym; however, the promise to help in the construction of the Georgian armed forces was suspended. The question of entry into the CIS remained open. Georgia sought to obtain the necessary weapons, but, by the Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992, only members of the CIS had the right to a military quota. For this reason and because of the continuing war in South Ossetia, Tbilisi authorities could not qualify for 220 tanks, artillery systems, combat aircraft and helicopters. After the Dagomys meeting and the decision on the cessation of hostilities in South Ossetia, as well as the "Communiqué" of 24 June 1992 [9], Yeltsin and Shevardnadze agreed on further cooperation. As a result of the "Dagomys Accord", the Russian leadership proceeded to violate the Tashkent Agreement and, by way of an exception, provided Georgia with tanks, aircraft and other weapons. The process of transferring the military equipment and ammunition was completed in late July-early August 1992. Shevardnadze once again assured Yeltsin that he would enter the CIS, as over a matter of 2 or 3 days he would solve the problem of Abkhazia "with little blood." Yeltsin supported Georgia's leader until 25 September 1992. On this day, Eduard Shevardnadze at a meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York asked for help from the West, blaming Russia. This speech and his insulting remarks with reference to the Abkhazians confused many in the hall of the UN. Yeltsin was annoyed and in his circle, not without malice, noted: "Shevardnadze imagines himself president of a great power but in fact does not even head a banana republic ..." [10] On the same day, 25 September, the oppositional Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution "On the situation in the North Caucasus in connection with the events in Abkhazia," in which it demanded the immediate withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia and restoration of the legitimate government. From New York Shevardnadze flew to Moscow, but Yeltsin received him very coldly. The Russian leadership were convinced that the Tbilisi leader had no intention of joining the CIS. Failure to evaluate properly this important geopolitical factor led to the realisation by Yeltsin and Defence Minister P. Grachëv that Shevardnadze and Kitovani were only trying to take advantage of Russian military support. Thus, from the end of September 1992, the position of the Russian élite towards Tbilisi was not that simple. After the defeat of the Georgian troops in Gagra in October 1992, the Abkhazian authorities took control of the north-western border with Russia at the R. Psou. The situation at this time changed radically. The Georgian State Council adopted a resolution "On the transition to active military operations in Abkhazia." In this regard, two months after the war began, on 22 October, General Sharashenidze sent Shevardnadze a detailed note and proposals on the military question. [11] He warned the head of Georgia of the consequences that might occur as a result of taking hasty and not properly assessed measures. I will not detail the nature of this interesting note with its realistic view of the new balance of power, I shall note only that the author says: "Today, the situation has changed in favour of the enemy," and for him "there is being created an offensive group." He speaks of the possible encirclement of Sukhum and a strike on Ochamchira. "The forces of the Georgian side are scattered formations, hastily equipped and there is no unified command," remarked Sharashenidze. He suggests: "To abandon the planned offensive in the next 2-3 days in the direction of Gudauta and Tkvarchal, and to focus on the defence of Sukhum". Among the various recommendations, there are also some that are quite unexpected, with an environmental slant, "together with scientists from the Georgian Technical University and other research-centres, urgently to prepare the use of directed explosions, [with the aim of] creating artificial mud-flows in the valleys (in the case of necessity)." As a result, notes L. Sharashenidze, though scheduled for the end of October 1992, the "large-scale offensive was rejected", and also never implemented were the proposed measures. As is well-known, on 27 July 1993, a ceasefire-agreement was signed in Sochi. Sharashenidze participated in the meeting in the capacity of chief military adviser to the Ministry of Defence of Georgia. "I would like to draw attention to the fact,” he wrote, “that Shevardnadze then missed a great opportunity to use Russian troops to prevent the loss of Abkhazia". [12] About what kind of chance in July 1993 was general L. Sharashenidze speaking? It turns out that the Russian side then offered to keep in Sukhum two Russian divisions, transfer the headquarters of the Joint Control Commission from Sochi to Sukhum and to bring into the city a reinforced battalion with 30 BMPs. According to the general, these were real actions that could have saved Sukhum. However, the Georgian side rejected the proposals. "Shevardnadze should not have allowed this," concludes L. Sharashenidze. [13] The next tragic mistake by Shevardnadze the general considered to be the events of the second half of September 1993. Judging by this eloquent testimony, it is evident that Abkhazia at that time was on the verge of some disaster. Behind our backs, outright trading was going on: Georgia was again invited to join the CIS in exchange for Abkhazia. The covert struggle and hidden agendas of the great powers only by a miracle failed to produce the desired results. Objective circumstances were above some subjective aspirations. However, judge for yourselves. I cite almost in full the testimony of the eyewitness of those tumultuous events: "And one of his (Shevardnadze’s – S. L.) big mistakes was this,” L. Sharashenidze notes. “On 16 September, Defence Minister G. Karkarashvili and I were in Moscow with Russian Defence Minister P. S. Grachëv. The meeting went well. Grachëv promised weapons, equipment, and high-level cooperation in the implementation by the Abkhazian side of the ceasefire-conditions. Karkarashvili in the evening flew to Tbilisi, but I stayed in Moscow to prepare with Colonel-General Galkin the position on the status of the Russian troops in Georgia. By this time I had been appointed Deputy Defence Minister for relations with the Russian Army. “On 17 September, the Abkhazian side treacherously violated the Sochi armistice-agreement,” continues Sharashenidze, “and started military operations in the direction of Ochamchira, and, one day later, in the direction of Sukhum too ... “Shevardnadze called Moscow and asked me to contact P. S. Grachëv in order for him to take measures and stop the Abkhazian side. On this day, Grachëv was in hospital, but later in the evening, with the head of the Main Operations Directorate, he flew to Adler, where, on 18 September, he had a meeting with Shevardnadze, Minister of Defence G. Karkarashvili, and Minister of Security I. Batiashvili, at which Grachëv proposed to introduce into Georgia two airborne-paratroop divisions, the Pskov and the Tula, introducing one of them later to Azerbaijan – they had the agreement of the Azerbaijani side. “To this proposal G. Karkarashvili reacted very painfully by saying that this would be a new occupation of Georgia, and he would resign, but Shevardnadze was silent, thus refusing to consent to the deployment of Russian troops. P. S. Grachëv told me so himself in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff M. P. Kolesnikov, upon his return from Adler,” notes Sharashenidze. “…I immediately called Shevardnadze and told him about this; he told me to fly immediately to Sukhum with our prepared project for the status of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus. “Late at night on 19 September, I flew to the besieged city, where in the suburbs street-battles were underway. There was no unified authority ... “I went to E. A. Shevardnadze after midnight and told him about the project on the status of Russian troops in Georgia that had been agreed with the Russian side and asked him to accept the proposal of P. S. Grachëv for introduing into Georgia two divisions and also entry into the CIS. ‘Let’s wait a couple of days,’ Shevardnadze replied. “Three days passed, and, on 23 September, Shevardnadze announces his agreement to introduce the paratroop-divisions into Abkhazia and requests an urgent call to P. S. Grachëv to tell him about this. ‘But regarding entry into the CIS, let’s wait a little bit,’ Shevardnadze told me. “It was late, and we didn’t succeed in calling Grachëv; I went to the chief of the General Staff M. P. Kolesnikov, who, after listening to me, said: ‘The train has departed – we cannot move a single soldier anywhere,’ as, on 21 September, the well-known events at the White House had begun (the confrontation between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin) ... Thus was missed another chance not to lose Abkhazia and thousands of lives. “On the 24th, with the agreement of Shevardnadze on the project for the status of Russian troops in Georgia, I flew to Moscow and, on the same day, met the Chief of the General Staff M. P. Kolesnikov and handed him a letter addressed to P. S. Grachëv." [14] In this letter of 24 September, General L. Sharashenidze, on behalf of E. Shevardnadze, asked the Minister of Defence for Russia to return to the earlier plan of 17 September 1993 that had been rejected by Tbilisi and to begin its urgent implementation by the Russian army in order to stop the ‘bloodshed in Abkhazia’. [15] However, the train had in actuality already departed. Despite this, E. Shevardnadze, on 26 September 1993, addressed a letter to Boris Yeltsin, V. Chernomyrdin, and P. Grachëv. In it, for the first time, the head of Georgia openly declares his readiness to join the CIS. Interestingly, this historical document was sent from Sukhum, where Shevardnadze found himself at the time as a political hostage. Having fallen into a trap and being in a real nightmare, he could not have dreamed that, like a prisoner, he would be pleading with the Russian government to save not only Georgia but also his own life. "In Sukhum a catastrophic situation has been created; there is a real the danger of the town falling,” declares Shevardnadze the day before the liberation of the capital of Abkhazia. “There are hand-to-hand battles in the streets; hundreds of innocent people are being killed. “The only salvation now lies in the immediate involvement by way of peacekeeping troops of part of the paratroops stationed in Georgia. “This seems the only way to prevent an even greater tragedy. Speed of action is everything -- tomorrow will be too late, because today, in these hours and minutes, the fate of the country is being decided. “Based on the above, I earnestly beseech you, Boris, to save Georgia. “I am telling you, if this now has any meaning, that I have taken the decision on Georgia’s entry into the Commonwealth of Independent States. We agree on the introduction into the conflict-zone of the military units proposed by General Pavel Grachëv at the meeting in Sochi. “I ask you to take the decision without delay. This is the last hope of myself and of my people. “With respect and hope, “E. Shevardnadze." But there was no reaction to these sobs. There is no doubt that the events and the outcome of the war would have been totally different, if Georgia from the beginning (from February-March 1992) had entered the CIS. Contrary to the various plans and circumstances, Abkhazia emerged victorious from this unequal battle. Good luck and chance both smiled on us: the Abkhazian offensive (16-30 September 1993) almost exactly coincided with the Russian crisis (21 September–4 October), which ended in Moscow with tank-fire unleashed upon the parliament. Thus, Russia was experiencing its own developing problems, and, in this turmoil, when Yeltsin was fighting for power, he had no time for Shevardnadze, who was suffering the most genuine misfortune in besieged Sukhum. [16] Caught in a bind already after the defeat in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze flew to Moscow. On 8 October 1993, Yeltsin had a meeting with the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The next day, 9 October, Georgia joined the CIS, Russia and Georgia signing an agreement on Russian military bases in Georgia, including Poti. The Russian army took control of the Samtredia-Poti-Tbilisi stretch of the railway. [17] "That which we did not do in a timely manner,” lamented Sharashenidze, “we did after losing thousands of people and our territorial integrity". [18] Abkhazia thus gained de facto independence, and Georgia at the time returned to the Russian sphere of influence. It would be wrong to assume that E. Shevardnadze did not understand the consequences of his obstinacy on the issue of the CIS. Of course, as a politician, he deliberately chose to take that risk.The question is, why? Because Shevardnadze had long been tied through serious obligations to the government of the United States, which took the decision to return him to Georgia, having enlisted the support of Moscow. Of such stratagems the ingenuous General L. Sharashenidze apparently had no idea. In this regard, attention is drawn to another eloquent but little known fact. It turns out that, already in February 1992, in the very month that Sharashenidze spoke at the Minsk CIS summit, Shevardnadze immediately left for the United States. During this visit, he signed with the company «Brock Group Ltd" a protocol on the strategic concept of the economic revival of Georgia, including expansion of the network of oil-terminals on the Black Sea, the reconstruction of the sea-ports of Poti and Batumi, the transformation of Batumi airport into an international terminal ... [19] Worthy of particular note is the fact that, at that time, Shevardnadze was not the head of Georgia [with the authority] to be signing any documents at all, let alone one on a protocol of international order, but, behind the scenes, the world had already reached its own solution to this problem. The ex-Minister of the Soviet Union was able to secure the political and diplomatic support of Washington. Thus did Shevardnadze become involved in the great western game around the newly discovered rich deposits of oil in Azerbaijan. This was the prelude to the laying of the future Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which bypassed Russia and slotted into the strategic plans of the West – to gain direct access to Caspian energy-reserves, which was for the first time officially announced in 1994. Such far-reaching goals, of course, did not fit the Russian project (to tie Georgia in to the CIS). This is despite the fact that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared: Russia's policy in the early 90's followed the lead of U.S. foreign policy. However, the administration of Boris Yeltsin, under pressure from patriotic forces, sometimes allowed itself some obstinacy, especially in the matter of its Near Abroad. Shevardnadze did not consider this and relied excessively on the United States and the West in general, not wishing to reckon with the Russian factor. Such demonstrative behaviour irritated both Yeltsin, the military, and Parliament. As a result, the over-confidence of Shevardnadze was punished, and Georgia suffered a collapse ... As for the coups d'etat in Azerbaijan and Georgia against elected presidents Elchibey and Gamsakhurdia, it was as if they had been unnoticed by the international community. These coups, according to Belgian researchers Eric Remacle and Olivier Paye, “were simply acceptable for the great powers, and especially for Russia". [20] In this connection, the saying of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia is of interest. "You could say,” he declared, “that in Georgia the military coup was effected from across the ocean with the personal involvement of Baker and with the blessing of Bush". [21] The Russian leadership did not at that time remain on the sidelines, placing military-technical and financial support in the hands of the rebels [22], and standing behind them in the wings with his American friends was Shevardnadze. He rendered them great services relating primarily to the collapse of the Soviet Union, unjustified deference at the time of the collapse of the GDR and the reunification of Germany, hasty withdrawal of Soviet troops, transfer to the Americans of 50 thousand square kilometers of an area of the Bering Sea rich in biological and energy-resources, etc. That is why Western leaders welcomed the return of Shevardnadze to Tbilisi. Georgia immediately emerged from international isolation when more than 30 countries over a short period recognized it as an independent republic, whilst the U.S. and Canada were willing to provide large loans. Moreover, despite the ongoing war in South Ossetia, Georgia, on 24 March 1992, was admitted to the CSCE (now OSCE), and, on 31 July, two weeks before the war against Abkhazia, the United Nations. As can be seen from these examples, a cynical policy of "double standards" by the leading Western countries found its own vivid expression. __________________________ This article was published by ApsnyPress and is translated from Russian. [К 20-летию начала войны Грузии против Абхазии Станислав Лакоба] http://abkhazworld.com/articles/conflict/912-on-the-20th-anniversary-of-the-start-of-georgias-war-against-abkhazia.html

Interview of George Hewitt: I hope that my position is now as clear as clear can be.

On 15 August 2012, the Tbilisi-based Mingrelian journalist Fridon Dochia, representing a Georgian internet-media-group interested in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, sent me the following questions in Georgian. On 19 August I sent him my replies, also in Georgian. The following is my translation of the Q-&-A exchange. You are a kartvelologist. A bond of friendship used to unite you with Georgian linguists. But unexpectedly you came sharply to oppose them and the whole Georgian people. What brought all of this about? Surely it wasn’t the fact that you became a son-in-law of the Abkhazians, was it? I am considerably surprised that after 20 years there still exists on the other side of the Ingur [Abkhazia’s border with Georgia] the wholly mistaken notion that the Open Letter to the Georgian People that I wrote in 1989 was occasioned by my kinship with the Abkhazians. I married an Abkhazian in 1976 and had a wonderful relationship with the Georgian until the summer of 1989 when the first ethnic clashes took place in Sukhum and Ochamchira. I don’t think it can be counted an exaggeration or boasting on my part if I say that at that time I was the only Western kartvelologist interested in the question of the minorities living within Georgia (and well informed about them to boot), since I was close not only to the Georgians but also to the Abkhazians. From week to week I was reading with alarm in the papers sent to me from Georgia what was being said against the minorities (especially the Abkhazians) by Georgia’s opposition-members of the day and by leading members of the so-called intelligentsia. Since I could see what a danger all this represented to the country (including all of its inhabitants), I decided to come out myself (after all, I was known to many as a kartvelologists and foreign supporter of Georgia, wasn’t I?) with advice to the effect that the type of nationalism propounded by Gamsakhurdia, K’ost’ava and Ch’ant’uria would in no way lead Georgia to a brilliant future. So, tell me, was I right or not? If anyone reads my Open Letter with open eyes (or, more importantly, an open mind), (s)he will sense that the advice was offered in order to be of benefit to both sides. I wasn’t seeking enmity with the Georgians – I’m not a moron. But we all know the result of what I wrote. The only surprising thing is that if any on the other side of the Ingur is still thinking upto today that, after everthing that has happened, I should be supporting a side whose case rests on insults and abuse, on falsification of history, and, if one is to call a spade a spade, on bare-faced lies. In August 2008, the whole world (including your country) condemned Russia’s occupation of Georgia. Do you share this view? If not, why? Any ordinary citizen of Abkhazia or one knowledgeable about Abkhazia’s internal situation will immediately reply everyone who poses them the question that nick-naming Abkhazia and South Ossetia “occupied territories” totally fails to conform with reality on the ground, and use of this phrase simply reveals the regional ignorance of the user. Such verbal games can in no way correct the results of Georgia’s from the very start retrograde politics or help it achieve its goal. After the occupation, Russia recognised as independent states Abkhazia and the Tskhinval Region. However, only up to five states have supported Moscow, and that at the price of a certain sum. On the contrary, the EU and USA have recognized Abkhazia and the Tskhinval Region as occupied territories of Georgia. Why do you suppose that is? In March 1992 the West understood nothing about (the internal situation of) Georgia at the time it recognised the country – at that time Georgia basically received recognition because of the reputation Shevardnadze had earned in the West, and this was a huge mistake. But when Shevardnadze turned out to be an unworthy leader (and not, as previously, the executor of the decisions of others), it was too late. Nobody likes to admit his/her own mistakes, and, since Georgia’s present (latest unworthy) administration had the idea of labelling the lost republics “occupied territories”, its Western friends like sheep followed Saak’ashvili down this path even further into the existing cul-de-sac. So what? Is anything really changing (or going to change hereafter) following this decision? Nothing! It would be better for the Georgians, rather than seeking to realise the unrealisable, to take responsibility for their own behavious, to acknowledge the fact that they will not be able to get back again what has been lost, to think of the future (and not the past), and to find a common language with all neighbouring countries (i.e. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia). There is no other way out. In reality, Georgia should have recognised Abkhazia as an independent republic on 30 September 1993. And, if it takes this step now, that will be the best means for Georgia and (in its track) the whole world to prevent the process of Abkhazia’s moving closer to Russia. The Georgians seem to have forgotten one elementary fact, i.e. that after the end of a war the loser is not granted the right to decide the course of the future. You call yourself Abkhazia’s ambassador in Gt. Britain. Does Gt. Britain’s Foreign Office recognise your status? I do not call myself Abkhazia’s ambassador in Gt. Britain – I am Abkhazia’s Honorary Consul and nothing more. What does my country’s Foreign Office have to do with it? It can’t have a voice in the matter. When interested individuals want information about Abkhazia, they approach me, and I try to help them. If any wants to obtain a visa for Abkhazia, I make one out for them. That’s all there is to it. Politicians close to the Kremlin in Russia already do not hide the fact that Russia will annex Abkhazia and the Tskhinval Region. Recently, it became clear from the results of a survey conducted by the “Levada Centre” that 43% of Russians want Abkhazia to be represented only within the constituency of the Russian Federation. Given that, what have the Abkhazian people gained through their so-called friendship with Russia? Don’t you suppose that in the near future they will share the fate of their relatives, the Ubykhs? The Ubykh language disappeared because the Ubykhs’ leaders at that time acted foolishly when in 1864 because of religion they took their people to find a new life in the Ottoman Empire and then, once there, decided that their Ubykh language had no value that they should no longer teach it to their children. They should have stayed in their homeland. True, Stalin and Beria would have had many of them killed, but even so the Ubykhs would have survived as a socio-linguistic entity. It was the Georgians (and not the Russians) who attacked the Abkhazians in August 1992 and slaughtered 4% of their population over the course of 14 months – neither should we forget the threats of Q’arq’arashvili and Khaindrava that the Georgians were ready to liquidate the entire Abkhazian nation root and branch. After this is there really anyone left over the Ingur who can think that in the 21st century the Abkhazians should be afraid of the Russians (and not of the Georgians)?! If anyone does really think that way, they are deceiving themselves. It is as a result (the phrase “thanks to” might suit this context) the behaviour of the Georgians (and of the Georgians alone) that today knowledge of the Abkhaz language is widening and deepening among the young folk, since they have realised that language is one of the main indicators of ethnicity. At the same time, all Abkhazians (of an appropriate age, at least) regularly assert: “Thank God that we are not so gullible as the Mingrelians, who during the last 60 years of the Soviet Union gave in to pressure from their neighbouring people and have been georgianised almost entirely. We Abkhazians shall never forget our ethnic identity.” I hope that my position is now as clear as clear can be.

European and US Approaches to the Abkhaz-Georgian Conflict by Arda Inal - Ipa

Until recently, there were no serious differences between European and US approaches to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. This was in spite of the US government’s "special relationship" with Georgia, often referred to as an “American project” under Saakashvili. Both European and US relations are characterised by an insistence of the precedence of territorial integrity over the right to self-determination; a denial that a precedent had been set in Kosovo; and praise for Georgia’s post-communist democracy-building while ignoring democratisation in Abkhazia and persistently refusing to recognise the legitimacy of Abkhaz elections.
The Europeans and US responded alike even to Georgia’s democratic shortcomings in the domestic arena, failing to critique departures from democratic governance such as the suppression of free speech, persecution of the opposition, increased control of civil society organisations, the forced dispersal of peaceful demonstrations and others.
Even when Saakashvili’s policies flagrantly failed to toe the line established by Washington or Brussels "nudges" to pull the Georgian administration into line were conveyed exclusively behind the scenes.
In geopolitical terms, the US has positioned itself as the more active and interested player in the context of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts.The US, more than Europe, also tends to perceive the conflicts in terms of opposition to Russia. Europe has not, of course, matched the level of confrontation with Russia reached by the US in 2008 when the US deployed its navy to the Black Sea.
On the other hand, at the level of high politics, both Europe and America deal unceremoniously with countries that have recognised Abkhazia’s independence or are merely considering this as an option. Belarus has been threatened with retaliatory measures by Javier Solana, as has Tuvalu in a letter from Hillary Clinton, as well as the Dominican Republic and other actual or potential political partners of Abkhazia.¹
The change in the White House administration brought hopes that the US might take a more objective view of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts. A fairly constructive meeting was held between Hillary Clinton and Sergey Lavrov in Moscow in October 2009, following which Clinton spoke of the importance of constructing a ‘status neutral approach’.² However in reality nothing changed and the current rhetoric used by the American administration involves repeatedly raising the subject of “territorial integrity” and the “occupied territories”, which differs little from Senator McCain’s speeches.
Of course, neither the US nor Europe could have failed to realise that current approaches to the conflicts are not leading anywhere. Given the lack of any evident progress and with no alternative policies, the US has simply stopped spending money on expensive peacebuilding projects. This has led to a virtual cessation of visits to Abkhazia by US diplomats and representatives of US foundations which might support humanitarian, research or development programmes in Abkhazia.
Distinctive aspects of European policy
Unlike the US, Europe is actively exploring new approaches towards resolution. In 2009, a European strategy was proposed on Abkhazia and South Ossetia “engagement without recognition”.³ This strategy was aimed at overcoming the isolation of these partially recognised countries. The Georgian administration understood well the potential of this approach and promptly presented their own “State Strategy on the Occupied Territories”, which stated that all engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia had to be authorised by or in some way involve the Georgian Ministry of Reintegration. Unsurprisingly, this proposal was rejected by the Abkhaz and South Ossetians and unfortunately the Europeans quickly lost the initiative over its new approach, allowing the Georgians to stamp out all proposals for Abkhaz direct engagement with Europe.
It is of course difficult to talk of a unified European approach given the variety of European institutions and programmes which often operate independently of each other – the OSCE, the EU’s European Neighbourhood and Eastern Partnership policies, the European Parliament, PACE, etc. Moreover, there are substantive differences between the old and new member states’ approaches. Despite these difficulties, Europe is attempting to construct a more systemic approach based on expert research, field studies and public opinion. Europe’s interest in gaining a deeper understanding of the context may be because Abkhazia and Georgia share a Black Sea border with EU member states and therefore instability in that region would present a real threat for Europe. This may also be the reason why Europe continues to support international NGOs working on both sides of the conflict divide despite the economic crisis. As a result, European institutions are taking a more rounded and sophisticated view of the situation. Europe appears to be beginning to understand that there is no future in an over-simplistic vision of conflict resolution through confidence-building meetings between the sides and that instead, the time has come to build confidence with Europe itself. Europe’s image as an “honest broker” has been dented by its uncritical stance on Georgia's position on the one hand and its rigid approach to the unrecognised states over many years on the other.
New messages coming from Europe
In May 2012, the latest ENP annual Progress Report on Georgia set out delicately but quite clearly some areas where the EU and US views on engagement with the “conflict regions” diverge. Recommendations in the report stress that “Status Neutral Travel Documents” should not be the only means of travel for populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since they are not widely accepted by them. Particularly important is the fact that the report invites Georgia to review the law on occupied territories because it is hindering de-isolation.⁴
The significance of this EU report for the Abkhaz can hardly be exaggerated, given its explicit statement that European engagement with Abkhazia is not simply a proclaimed abstract aim but Europe is ready to undertake real steps to overcome isolation of Abkhazia.
Returning to the US position, we also see some signs that the EU report has not been entirely ignored by the US administration. Hillary Clinton, in her speech in Batumi in June 2012,⁵ appeared at first sight to give exclusive backing to the idea of “neutral passports” for people living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by promising that the US would recognise them and that it was willing to grant those in possession of these documents the possibility to study at American educational establishments. However, a closer look at the wording used by Ms Clinton used (‘for those who choose” the neutral document) suggest that she is also admitting the right to choose freely between documents. In other words, Clinton is not ruling out the possibility that people living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia can use their current Russian passports, as such differing from the position which would fully satisfy Georgia -a statement denying the legitimacy of Russian passports for South Ossetians and Abkhaz.
The EU report thus sends out very important signals to all interested parties. Primarily, the EU’s recommendations demonstrate unambiguously that Europe’s strategy on engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia does not coincide with the Georgian strategy on engagement on major issues.
Secondly, it is now clear that Europe’s dealings with Georgia involve not only signalling support for Georgia but also publicly expressing disapproval and concern at a series of destructive but widely publicised actions in relation to the conflicts. Of course a question remains over whether, if Georgia chooses to ignore the European recommendations, there will be the will to apply the usual sanctions.
Conclusion
The ENP report on Georgia signals opportunities for positive change. This makes it more likely that Abkhazia will accept the findings of European experts rather than dismissing them as deliberately biased, which in turn may allow it to consider some useful recommendations outlined in earlier assessments of European diplomats and experts which the Abkhaz side rejected because of their “pro-Georgian” starting point.
If Abkhazia adopts a more constructive tone in its relations with Europe and dispenses with ultimatums and nit-picking over formalities, there could be grounds for some hope that progress will be made on Abkhazia’s de-isolation.
A more consistent approach by Europe in relation to Georgia is important for both Abkhaz and Georgian societies. On the eve of the October 2012 parliamentary elections, new notes in Europe’s messages will send out a signal that Europe will not turn a blind eye to the use of undemocratic campaigning methods.⁶
If there is further evidence that Europe is adopting a more balanced approach to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, this will be hugely significant since this will help Europe to be a more effective and sought-after mediator throughout the South Caucasus. Unconditional support for one side of the conflict will only exacerbate divisions, whereas strenuous efforts at objectivity and impartiality will create the right conditions for the mutual search for formula for stability in the Caucasus which involves both sides in the conflict and major players such as Russia and Europe.
 http://www.international-alert.org/content/european-and-us-approaches-georgian-abkhaz-conflict-english