Сomment on an article in the Vanuatu Independent: To Tamar Vashakidze and the people of Vanuatu

Facts can be discussed in an objective and meaningful way. Then there are the ‘facts’ disseminated by Georgian lobbyists, which are neither meaningful nor (by definition) objective. Sadly, the contents of Tamar Vashakidze’s article, which was recently published in the Vanuatu Independent, fall into the latter category.

Vashakidze places quotation-marks around the phrase ‘national self-determination, raising a question thereby about the legitimacy of the use of this term with reference to the Abkhazians. But for us Abkhazians our self-determination is a crucial counterpoint to the colonialism and imperialism practised against us over the decades by Georgia, and understanding this is crucial to reaching a peace-settlement.

We Abkhazians have our own self-designation in our native tongue; this is ‘Apswa’ (plural ‘Aspwaa’). When Georgians and their foreign supporters refer to us in this way, it is not to honour our ethnonym but to cast aspersions on our historical entitlement to our native territory. The reason for this is the gross distortion of history (propounded in Georgia since the 1880s but mostly associated with a notorious publication from the time of Stalin’s and Beria’s repression of the Abkhazians by the Georgian literary specialist Pavle Ingoroqva) is to insinuate that the ‘true’ Abkhazians of history were a Georgian-speaking tribe, whilst the nation to which we are proud to belong came relatively late to the territory of Abkhazia, dominating and taking over the name of the territory’s ‘true’ autochthons. The determined revival of the ‘Ingoroqvan Hypothesis’ in the late 1980s was a factor that led inevitably to the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-3. 

That war broke out when the Georgian authorities of the day, which, by the way, totally lacked any democratic mandate but which was led by the West’s darling Eduard Shevardnadze, invaded Abkhazia and occupied most of the towns and villages, including the capital our Sukhum, on 14 August 1992.  During the first months of the conflict, when the West preferred to look the other way, it was the non-‘Georgian’ [ non-Kartvelian] civilians who were attacked and had to flee as they were beaten, robbed and killed, their houses and apartments looted. 

The Commander-in-chief of Georgian troops in Abkhazia, General Giorgi Karkarashvili, issued the following chilling threat in a formal televised address to the Abkhazian and Georgian people in Sukhum on 24 August: “No prisoners of war will be taken...If 100,000 Georgians lose their lives, then [on the Abkhazian side] all 97,000 will be killed...The Abkhazian nation will be left without descendants.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XzvtaZIMy98

Regretfully, when discussing the problem of Kartvelian refugees, no-one bothers to remember the above-mentioned facts and that the Kartvelian population of Abkhazia mostly greeted Shevardnadze’s tanks and soldiers with joy.

Specific attacks were directed against Abkhazian political, cultural, intellectual and community leaders. In addition to the disappearance or killing of Abkhazians, removal or destruction of the principal materials and buildings of important historical and cultural importance to Abkhazians took place in what appears to have been an organised attempt to destroy the very cultural and national identity of the Abkhazians.

The Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994 (S/1994/674), English page33, Paragraph 129 states with regard to ethnic cleansing that it is: 

"the planned deliberate removal from a specific territory, persons of a particular ethnic group, by force or intimidation, in order to render that area ethnically homogenous. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention"...

Medical authorities in Gudauta (northern Abkhazia) reported that virtually all men who had passed through the Gudauta hospital, after having been held prisoner by Georgian authorities, appeared to have been severely tortured. Many had sustained multiple broken bones and burns from cigarettes or other objects on various parts of their bodies. Some had their ears partially or completely torn off. See UNPO's Abkhazia Report, November 1992, b. Human Rights and Cultural Destruction  at
http//www.unpo.org/downloads/AbkGeo1992Report.pdf 

Tamar Vashakidze, Head of Advocacy and Communications in Georgia, stated in the article that the Apswaa are a small ethnic group which formed less than 20% of Abkhazia’s pre-war population and which carried out severe ethnic cleansing, wiping out or deporting some 75% of the ‘Georgian’ [recte Kartvelian] population of Abkhazia. For whom is this kind of brainwashing intended? Is it credible that 20% Abkhazians could pose such a threat to 75% Kartvelians?  The demographic threat in Abkhazia came rather from the artificial increase of the territory’s Kartvelian population, largely as a result of population-transfers during the Stalin-Beria period, in order to swamp us Abkhazians in our homeland.

The readers of the Vanuatu Independent should know that Abkhazia’s status was downgraded to that of a mere ‘autonomous republic’ in 1931 within Stalin’s home-republic, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.  In those days all problems were solved by central diktat, in which the former republics of the USSR dragged out their existence in an atmosphere of total fear and in which violations of human rights were the norm. The geographical borders of the Soviet socialist republics were redrawn, and, in the case of Abkhazia, this was done in favour of Georgia. Although for most of the Soviet period Abkhazia had the status of an autonomous republic, it has NEVER been a Georgian region and no one is supposed to incorporate it into the  Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation, followed by Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru have recognised Abkhazia as an independent state; the same applies in the case of South Ossetia. Any country is free to do the same (or not), but their decision should be based on proper appreciation of the facts and not on self-serving propaganda emanating from Tbilisi, the capital of the aggressor state. 

Response to Connor Schratz

Response to Connor Schratz

In his article “GEORGIAN REFUGEES SEEK HELP AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY”

CONNOR SCHRATZ commits some factual errors. Anyone familiar with the problem will deem them completely outlandish (not to say provocative).

The number of refugees — presumably the author means ‘Georgians’ [recte Kartvelians, the cover-term for Georgians, Mingrelians, Laz and Svans] —  mentioned in the article cannot be correct. Let us carry out an analysis.

According to the article, ‘400,000 citizens, either internally displaced or foreign refugees, have demanded a right of return’. But were there ever 400,000 Kartvelian residents of Abkhazia? Consider the picture from the last Soviet census of 1989:

Year		'Georgians'		Abkhaz		Armenians		Russians		Greeks		Total
1989 Census		45.7% (239,872)		17.8% (93,267)		14.6% (76,541)		14.3% (74,913)		2.8% (14,664)		525,061

(Ethno-demographic history of Abkhazia, 1886 - 1989, by Daniel Müller)

[N.B. the vast majority of the so-called ‘Georgian’ population of Abkhazia in 1989 were actually Mingrelians]

In his next paragraph, the author asserts that “the Abkhaz quickly began persecuting Georgians within their borders, a large number of whom supported Georgia during the 1992-1993 war.”  In truth, however, it was the ‘Georgians’ who were persecuting the Abkhazians. This is a fact established in 1993 by none other than Amnesty International.

The author goes on to ‘inform’ his readers: “Thousands of Georgians were killed or expelled into other regions, like Tskhinvali and South Ossetia. In the end, about 75% of the Georgians in Abkhazia were killed or displaced”.

Our author is perhaps confused about local geography if he thinks that ‘thousands of Georgians were killed or expelled into other regions like Tskhinvali and South Ossetia’. He should consult a map to realise that South Ossetia, with its capital Tskhinval, is a region far too far removed from Abkhazia for anyone seriously to believe that Georgians could flee there from Abkhazia. Now, let’s do some calculations. If 400,000 Kartvelians is accurate, then 75 percent of that figure produces 300,000 killed or displaced. And if 300,000 (75%) were killed, then we get 100,000 left to become refugees seeking a return. But, if 300,000 (75%) left, then the figure of 400,000 cannot be correct for the original total of Kartvelians. Bearing in mind the factual data from the 1989 Soviet census, these figures simply do not add up...

Consider now: “Abkhazia, a region in Western Georgia, comprised [recte populated] primarily by ethnic Abkhaz and Russians”.  But Abkhazia also incorporated Armenians,  and it can be easily seen in the above census that they outnumbered the Russian population.

In addition, in the Gal District of Abkhazia, approximately 60,000 refugees have spontaneously returned to farm their lands. This fact has been mentioned in official sources, e.g. 25 April 2005 http://reliefweb.int/node/172118

The survey was carried out by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) in conjunction with Conciliation Resources, with the financial support of the European Union’s Instrument for Stability. This policy-brief is based on the findings of a survey conducted in June 2010 among one thousand refugees from Abkhazia, displaced as a result of the 1992-93 war. The survey provides insight into so-called IDPs’ attitudes to displacement, return, conflict resolution and justice.

A quarter of refugees have been back to Abkhazia since first suffering displacement. The largely Mingrelian-inhabited Gal Region naturally accounts for a majority of these visits: 64% of displacees from Gal have been back. The ability regularly to visit Abkhazia is an important consideration for 85% of respondents. A majority cited maintaining a dwelling (58%) and visiting graves and cemeteries (55%) as the most pressing reasons to visit in case they could not return permanently. Refugees tend to focus on the right of return, often without realizing the extent to which Abkhazia has changed in the intervening years, or analyzing what conditions would have to be fulfilled for them to be able to exercise that right. The survey attempted to tease out what proportion would consider return to Abkhazia and under what conditions. 85% are only ready to consider returning if Georgia reestablishes control over Abkhazia. 87% say they would consider returning to Abkhazia permanently if Abkhazia reintegrates with Georgia; only 9% would consider return if Abkhazia remains outside of Georgia’s jurisdiction. Given these figures, refugee projections for whether and in what time-frames Abkhazia might reintegrate are an important indicator of their own understanding of how probable return might or might not be. 26% believe that Abkhazia will be reintegrated in the next 10 years; 11% expect significantly longer time-frames; 14% say never. 49% say they do not know. Nearly two thirds think the chances of Abkhazia becoming an integral part of Georgia have decreased since the 2008 conflict (as compared to 39% of the general population of Georgia).

http://www.c-r.org/our-work/caucasus/documents/2011/CR%20IDP%20in%20Georgia%20Brief%20Policy%20Brief%20web.pdf

ALLS Media Monitoring Team,

Sukhum, Abkhazia

Virtual Motion of the UN General Assembly

The resolution on the Status of the refugees (the so-called internally displaced persons) from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinval(i) Region/South Ossetia, Georgia (document A/65/L.74) was adopted by a recorded vote of 57 in favour to 13 against, with 74 abstentions.

In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu.

This motion can only be put down to the witchcraft-like influence of the Georgian lobby.

A more sober viewer would raise several questions. Consider the “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of the UN Commission on Human Rights (11 February 1998)”, and, in particular, the following:

Principle 6

“2. The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement:

b. In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;”

The countries that voted In Favour are perhaps not aware of the armed conflict or of the fact that Georgia has totally failed to establish any relationship with Abkhazia. On the contrary, Georgia has been continuously launching terrorist activity, forcing the refugees to form the “White Legion” and “Forest Brothers” terrorist groups to operate in Abkhazia’s border-region of Gal.

Principle 7

2. The authorities undertaking such displacement shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to the displaced persons, that such displacements are effected in satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene, and that members of the same family are not separated.

The countries that voted In Favour are probably not aware of the fact that, when the Georgian army invaded Abkhazia, it ransacked and destroyed Abkhazians houses and apartments. Did any representative of the of these 57 countries voting In favour bother to try to learn the conditions of ‘safety, nutrition, health and hygiene’ of the inhabitants of Abkhazia who suffered post-war water- and electricity-problems, accommodation-problems and post-war blockade for years until it was lifted following recognition by Russia.

Have these countries ever thought about the question of accommodation for the refugees before they voted In Favour? Where do they suppose returning Kartvelians would find work in Abkhazia when faced with such facts as:

1. Abkhazians do not speak Georgian, and conversely Kartvelians do not speak Abkhazian. Have these voters scheduled any language- or house-building programmes?

2. post-war Abkhazia is doing utmost but struggling to find employment for its own indigenous people in Abkhazia, a country intentionally and totally isolated from the world through sanctions imposed on it for being a victim of Georgian aggression.

Principle 10

1. Every human being has the inherent right to life which shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. Internally displaced persons shall be protected in particular against:

a. Genocide;

b. Murder;

c. Summary or arbitrary executions; and

d. Enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, threatening or resulting in death.

Threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts shall be prohibited.

The countries that voted In Favour perhaps do not know that on 14 August 1992 the Georgian invasion into Abkhazia began with persecution of Abkhazians, murder, arbitrary executions, and enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, threatening (or actually resulting in) death. During the war two clear threats of genocide were issued, one by a Georgian military leader (on video) and the other by a leading member of the aggressor administration (published in Le Monde Diplomatique), which means that, contrary to their usual condemnation of threats/commission of genocide, the countries voting In Favour openly ally themselves with a state that is guilty of the same.

Principle 29

1. Internally displaced persons who have returned to their homes or places of habitual residence or who have resettled in another part of the country shall not be discriminated against as a result of their having been displaced. They shall have the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and have equal access to public services.

The countries that voted In Favour are perhaps not aware of the fact that the refugees from Abkhazia are now actually residing on their indigenous lands, which they were forced to leave during (Georgian!) Stalin’s Black Terror (1937-1953) and in the land where the Georgian language is considered the state-language, though Mingrelian has no official status. It seems doubtful that these people would prefer to live in a different cultural atmosphere. Abkhazians treat Georgia as an enemy state. Georgia constantly instigates and demonstrates its odium towards Abkhazians. Georgia has failed to establish friendly relations. It is easy to damage relations, but it is not that easy to win back confidence. It takes decades or even centuries (as once stated by Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili) in an area like the Caucasus, where the blood-feud has been a centuries-old tradition.

Regretfully, the adopted UN Resolution on Status of IDPs and Refugees from Abkhazia was not based on documents, including the UN’s very own Reports on Georgia, not to mention a mass of historical data. One of our concerns is that Georgia will seek to gain wider support for this Resolution as it continues its determined efforts to dupe the international community into believing that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are ‘occupied territories’ and to divert attention from the humanitarian problems from which people continue to suffer. In a word, Georgia misrepresents itself to the international community, and that international community has proved itself far too gullible to such deception for far too long.

No one denies the fact that refugees deserve sympathy and proper care, but those who started the war should have considered the consequences for their kin in Abkhazia before taking the decision to begin hostilities.

ALLS Media Monitoring Team

Sukhum, Abkhazia

Reply: "US Senate to consider resolution on Russia's occupation of Georgia"

Reply

US Senate to consider resolution on Russia's occupation of Georgia May 11 2011, 23:40 http://abhazia.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/17080/

It is good that the US Senate will consider the situation regarding the presence of Russian troops in the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were deployed there on the basis of Russia's bilateral agreements with these republics.

However, there is no logic in "the US Senate preparing a resolution in support of Georgia”. Prior to the “creation of a substantial basis for a number of actions in the future”, a thorough analysis should be made to discover the reasons and consequences for the “presence of Russian troops” on Abkhazian soil.

It would be nice to refer to the US Senate reaction, if there was any in 1992, to the Georgian invasion of Abkhazia sanctioned by Russian President Eltsin.

Georgia launched a war against Abkhazia after the disintegration of the USSR as a consequence of its refusal to respect the Abkhazians’ desire to preserve their status. Georgia’s belief in a “Georgia for the Georgians” turned to: (a) mass-persecution of Abkhazians during the war; (b) destruction of monuments bearing Abkhazian names; (c) and the deliberate torching of Abkhazia’s two State Archives, where historical manuscripts were kept.

The Hague Conventions of 1907 , specifically its "Laws and Customs of War on Land" (Hague IV) of October 18, 1907: "Section III Military Authority over the territory of the hostile State." states in Article 42:

Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

Then, in 1995, Georgia was a Russia-orientated country signing the agreement on the deployment in Georgia of four Russian Military Bases.

One can hardly remember any response to this act by either the EU or the US Senate. This is understandable because both sides, Russia and Georgia, considered it mutually beneficial. In similar fashion, Russia and Abkhazia, two independent states that have recognized each other, have signed an agreement that satisfies the interest of both sides.

If Georgia makes political mistakes, these should be appropriately evaluated. Georgia should admit that the pages of history cannot be turned back and stop trying to impose on the whole world a false interpretation of its biased imperial designs. Abkhazia will not return to the “white gloves of Beria’s regime” whatever the US Senate or Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) may think, say or do.

---

Ответ

Сенат США рассмотрит резолюцию по оккупации Грузии Россией
11 мая 2011 г., 23:40 http://abhazia.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/17080/

Это хорошо, что Сенат США рассмотрит ситуацию в связи с присутствием российских войск на территории Южной Осетии и Абхазии, которые были размещены там, на основе двусторонних соглашений России с этими республиками.

Тем не менее, нет никакой логики в том, что "Сенат США подготовит резолюцию в поддержку Грузии". Прежде чем "создавать прочную основу для ряда действий в будущем", необходимо провести тщательный анализ для выявления причин и последствий "присутствия российских войск" на абхазской земле.

Было бы неплохо вспомнить реакцию Сената США, если таковая вообще была в 1992 году, на грузинское вторжение в Абхазию, санкционированное президентом России Ельциным.

Грузия начала войну против Абхазии после распада СССР, как следствие отказа уважать желание абхазов сохранить свой статус. Грузинская идея создания "Грузия для грузин" превратилась на деле в: (а) массовое преследование абхазов во время войны; (б) уничтожение памятников с абхазскими названиями; (с) и преднамеренный поджог двух государственных архивов Абхазии, где хранились исторические рукописи.

В Гаагской конвенции 1907 года, в частности, в "законах и обычаях ведения сухопутной войны" (Гаага IV) от 18 октября 1907 года, в "Разделе III. Военная власть на территории враждебного государства", в статье 42 говорится:

Территория признается оккупированной, когда она действительно находится во власти неприятельской армии.

Оккупация распространяется лишь на ту территорию, где эта власть установлена и осуществляет свою деятельность.

В 1995 году Грузия была страной ориентированной на Россию, и подписавшей соглашение о размещении в Грузии четырех российских военных баз.

Вряд ли можно припомнить какую-либо реакцию ЕС или Сената США на этот акт. Это понятно, та как обе стороны, Россия и Грузия, считали данный акт взаимовыгодным. Аналогичным образом, Россия и Абхазия, два независимых государства, признавшие друг друга, подписали соглашение, которое удовлетворяет интересы обеих сторон.

Если Грузия делает политические ошибки, то им должна быть дана соответствующая оценка. Грузия должна признать, что историю нельзя повернуть назад, и перестать навязывать всему мировому сообществу ложную интерпретацию ее тенденциозных имперских замыслов. Абхазия не вернется к " бериевскому режиму в белых перчатках " вне зависимости от того, что Сенат США или Парламентская Ассамблея Совета Европы (ПАСЕ) может думать, говорить или делать по этому поводу.