Saturday 26 May 2012

Democracy in Abkhazia: a testing year



George Hewitt, professor of Caucasian languages at London's School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS)

The story of elections in Abkhazia since the end of the fourteen-month war with Georgia in 1993 has been an honourable one for a young state scarred by the legacy of conflict and destruction and subject to many international pressures, threats and misunderstandings. In the last year, Abkhazia's democratic experience has continued with the election of a new president in August 2011 following the death of Sergej Bagapsh, and with legislative elections in March 2012.
The constitutional processes governing these elections were established in the early post-war years, notably by the constitution ratified on 26 November 1994. The conditions prevailing in the Black Sea territory in the aftermath of the war, which ended on 30 September 1993, had rendered presidential elections impractical; so Abkhazia’s parliament, newly transformed from the antecedent "Supreme Soviet", passed a resolution declaring that Vladislav Ardzinba - who had assumed the chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet before the war and then proved a charismatic war-leader - would be the republic’s president. The constitution of November 1994 formalised the situation where a dominant executive presidency and a subordinate legislature operated in tandem to administer the state, with the first competitive elections to the parliament taking place two years later in November 1996.
It is worth quoting from the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia [Apsny] in order to grasp how far this document has both framed electoral politics over the subsequent years and created potential ambiguities. Articles 36 and 37 at the beginning of Chapter 3 on Legislative Power respectively state that "All the legislative authority established by this Constitution shall be exercised by the People’s Assembly (or Parliament) of the Republic of Abkhazia" and that "The Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia shall consist of 35 members. The elections to the Parliament shall be carried out on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage, by means of a secret ballot. The Parliament’s term of office shall be five years. The procedure for the Parliamentary elections shall be established by a constitutional law."
In contrast, Chapter 4 on Executive Power begins with Article 48: "Executive Power in the Republic of Abkhazia shall be granted to the President of the Republic of Abkhazia. The President of the Republic of Abkhazia shall be the head of state."
In the event, the relationship between these two arms of government has generally been cordial, but there have been occasional strains. In 1998, tensions arose when Vladislav Ardzinba was deemed to be behaving in a high-handed way in trying to interfere in the parliament’s decision-making process. In 2009, in the run-up to the presidential election, the incumbent Sergej Bagapsh made a proposal to parliament that roused widespread opposition; after protesters broke into a session of deputies, the proposal was returned to Bagapsh with a request that he withdraw it.
(The president had wanted parliament to sanction the mass-issuing of Abkhazian passports to the Mingrelian residents of the Gal district in eastern Abkhazia, next to the border with Georgia, which would automatically have granted them the right to vote. After the hastily conceived proposal was dropped, only 3,581 Gal Mingrelians were left with permission to vote, of whom 2,947 cast their ballot (56% in favour of Bagapsh). Such disagreements testify to the open nature of political debate in the state, as WAS noted with reference to this dispute in Accord: an international review of peace-initiatives [7 / 1999]).
The parliamentary elections
Sergej Bagapsh was re-elected in 2009 and thus entered his second (and final) five-year term as president. Under normal circumstances, the next parliamentary elections should have been held half-way through his term, in 2012, and the next presidential election in 2014. But Bagapsh passed away in Moscow on 29 May 2011, aged merely 62, due to complications following an operation on his respiratory tract. Despite the unexpected and unwelcome shock, calm prevailed in Abkhazia, and an emergency presidential election was held on 26 August 2011 (the date when Russia had recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008).
The candidates were vice-president Aleksandr Ankvab, prime minister Sergej Shamba, and Raul Khadzhimba, who had held government posts under both Ardzinba and Bagapsh (in the latter’s first term). The campaigning was intensive and fully covered, free from bias, by all the media. The great interest across the country was reflected in a turnout of 71.92% of the electorate, with Ankvab securing a clear victory, thus obviating the need for any run-off. The conduct of the ballot (with voting-slips cast into transparent boxes) and the count (performed at each polling-station) was highly praised by the more than 100 observers from a wide range of countries (from France to Fiji). However, as with all the elections that have taken place in Abkhazia since 1993, the presidential election was ritualistically condemned as illegitimate by the bulk of the international community.
The legislative elections duly followed in two rounds on 10 March and 24 March 2012. Perhaps as a result of voter-fatigue, and despite both active campaigning and wide media coverage after the manner of the preceding presidential campaign, the turnout was markedly lower (44.51% in the first round, 46.21% in the second). Abkhazia's thirty-five constituencies were contested by 148 candidates in all, but the country's majoritarian system meant that on 10 March only thirteen candidates passed the necessary threshold.
One of these was Raul Khadzhimba, chairman of an opposition party, the "Forum of National Unity of Abkhazia" (he had trailed in third position in the 2011 presidential poll), suggesting that the label of "political corpse" attached to him then was somewhat premature. There was instant speculation that Khadzhimba, once elected, might become the next speaker, though it was Valerij Bganba, a member of the previous parliament, who gained this post on 3 April.
A further twenty deputies were elected on 24 March; there will be a re-run on 6 May in one constituency (number 1) where the turnout was too low, and the supreme court has yet to rule on the contested vote in another polling-district (number 21) where toponymist Valerij Kvarchia is one of the contenders (Kvarchia heads the Abkhazian commission that is contesting Russia’s territorial claim to the Abkhazian village of Aibga and its environs). The entire process was again overseen by a range of international observers, who found the proceedings to be above reproach. The first session of the newly elected parliament was held on 10 April.
156 candidates had initially put their names forward, thirty-five of whom were nominated by registered political parties and 126 by "initiative groups" (thus manifesting a degree of doubling in nomination). The central election commission approved 151 names, three of whom then withdrew. Of the remaining 148 candidates, 125 were Abkhazians, even though they compose roughly 50% of the population; this underlines the dominant position of Abkhazians in local politics since 1993. The other ethnic groups (with the possible exception of the Kartvelians, predominantly the Gal Mingrelians, who continue to reside in Abkhazia) still seem to be content with this situation, in recognition of the fact that the Abkhazians made the greatest sacrifice in the Georgian-Abkhazian war.
The other candidates included eleven Armenians (from around 17% of the population), eight Russians (some 10% of the population), two Greeks, two Kartvelians (around 20% of the population), one Kabardian and one Ossete. Among the thirty-three already elected deputies there are three Armenians and one Mingrelian. Only one woman, Emma Gamisonia, was elected; former deputy speaker Irine Agrba (and, indeed, former speaker Nugzar Ashuba) being among the six of nine former deputies who failed to secure re-election.
In terms of political affiliation, four of the eleven candidates from opposition parties were successful (all from Khadzhimba’s party), while only three members of the main party that supported the Bagapsh-Ankvab ticket in 2009 ("United Abkhazia") were elected - and among the unsuccessful candidates was that party’s chairman, Daur Tarba. This might be interpreted (at first glance) as an expression of disappointment in Ankvab’s presidency after only eight months. This would not necessarily be an accurate assessment, for United Abkhazia was the creation of, and particularly associated with, the late Sergej Bagapsh, whereas Ankvab’s party-support had originally come from smaller groupings which did not nominate any candidates in this election. How else, then, to evaluate the outcome?
The resilient republic
Among the reasons often given for Aleksandr Ankvab’s victory in 2011 is that he was seen as the most likely to pursue a determined fight against corruption and to establish the rule of law. He had stated in his manifesto the need for reforms in (inter alia) the interior ministry; and in mid-February 2012, he again singled out this ministry as meriting special attention at the same time as enforcing a range of personnel changes. A matter of days later, an attempt was made on Ankvab’s life - the sixth since his return to politics in Abkhazia following some years of success in business in Moscow (where he had moved after disagreement with Ardzinba in the wake of Abkhazia’s victory in the war with Georgia).
On the morning of 22 February, the motorcade conveying the president on his daily journey along the single highway connecting his home in Gudauta to his office in Sukhum came under attack from a roadside-bomb and sustained gunfire; Ankvab escaped unharmed, but two bodyguards perished.
In these circumstances, an interpretation of the parliamentary-election result suggests itself. Could it be that the voting public decided not to be taken for granted by meekly following previous voting patterns but rather (in a spirit of "a plague on all your houses") to give their support to some new blood in the hope that a parliament so constituted would be more likely to buttress Ankvab’s anti-corruption drive ? If so, this might be said to betoken a certain level of sophistication amongst the Abkhazian electorate.
In the meantime, Abkhazia’s international position remains unaltered. The collective refusal of most states to offer recognition to Abkhazia and its elections is a stance they seek to justify largely by reference to the fact that so many of Abkhazia’s pre-war Kartvelian (mostly Mingrelian) population have not lived there since September 1993 but eke out a frequently miserable existence as refugees (or internally displaced persons [IDPs], to use the term insisted upon by those who deem Abkhazia to be still part of Georgia) in Georgia or elsewhere. The territorial integrity of (Soviet) Georgia continues to be assigned precedence by the European Union, the United States and most United Nations member-states over the Abkhazians’ right to self-determination (though when it comes to the Falkland Islands in the south Atlantic, the British government at least prioritises self-determination).This stance does nothing to alter Abkhazians' desire to strengthen their hard-won independence , which also means improving the economy and addressing social problems (such as reducing the number of senseless deaths on the roads; a recent accident near Gudauta which claimed six young lives is an example of the kind of waste that the country cannot afford). The search continues for wider recognition, or, failing that, to persuade the international community at least to allow citizens of Abkhazia to travel the world on the strength of Abkhazia’s own passports, which fully comply with international standards (just as countries that do not recognise Taiwan or Kosovo accept these states’ passports as valid documents for travel purposes). This issue was on the agenda of the Abkhazian delegation for the latest round of talks in Geneva on 29 March, though no time was left to discuss it. The Georgian side, for its part, persisted in its attempt to score points over a non-issue, namely the renovation of Christian monuments on the territory of Abkhazia. The groundless allegation was made (and widely circulated in the international media) that the Abkhazians are taking the opportunity to erase Georgian traces in the local architecture. This contrived argument contrasts sharply with the very real act of cultural vandalism, motivated by a desire to liquidate documentary evidence of the Abkhazian presence on their home soil, whereby in the early stages of the 1992-93 war the Abkhazian research institute and library along with the state archives were deliberately torched with the loss of thousands of precious (and in many cases irreplaceable) documents and books.
The Abkhazians have responded to the accusations by allowing international inspection of the renovations at the Elyr (Ilori) monastery, where the visitors found nothing to criticise. As regards the Bedia church, which was built by, and is the site of the burial of, King Bagrat II (IIIrd by the Georgian reckoning), who became the first sovereign of the mediaeval united "Kingdom of the Abkhazians and Georgians" a millennium ago, it is pointed out that it was shelling by the Georgian side during the war which caused the most recent damage to this monument.
The church is a source of great pride for both the Abkhazian church and the public at large, as witnessed by the pages and photographs devoted to it in such luxurious publications as the 128-page book The Holy Sites of Abkhazia (in Russian) or the 239-page album Abkhazia (in Russian and English), both published in 2010 (see Semen Pegov, "Anzor Agumaa: Tbilisi Raised The Issue of the Bedia Church for Political Reasons ", AbkhazWorld, 4 February 2012).
In turn this dispute has been overshadowed by renewed tension resulting from the investigation into the 22 February attack on the president. Several individuals had been detained when, on 17 April, moves were made to arrest a 53-year-old former senior official, Aslambej Kchach (he had served from 1993-96 as head of the administration’s bodyguard service, and from 1996-2003 as the republic’s interior minister under President Ardzinba). Kchach thwarted the effort to arrest him by shooting himself, while on the same day another suspect already in detention, Timur Khutaba, was found hanging in his cell, and a third suspect also tried to commit suicide.
The combination of a president's death, two elections, an assassination attempt, struggles over recognition, domestic economic and social problems, the need to deflect baseless charges - and now, the messy and violent circumstances of the investigation into the attack on President Ankvab, has made for an eventful year. Abkhazia's democracy and institutions have thus far proved resilient. The challenges ahead may require that they become even more so.

 http://www.opendemocracy.net/george-hewitt/democracy-in-abkhazia-testing-year

Thursday 24 May 2012

The North Caucasus factor in the Abkhazia-Georgia conflict by Natella Akaba


1.      Introduction

The 1992-93 Georgia-Abkhazia war is a perfect example of former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali’s definition of a ‘new era conflict’. This type of armed conflict affects civilians as much as the armies of the hostile parties. In this case, the conflict has now spread beyond the South Caucasus and into the wider region, drawing in the citizens not only of Abkhazia and Georgia but also other countries – Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Syria and others, mainly the Abkhaz’ ethnic cousins the Adyghes, Kabardinians and Circassians, the Abaza, and members of the Abkhaz and Circassian diaspora. In fact, representatives from almost all the peoples living in the North Caucasus and the South Russian Cossacks have fought in Abkhazia. At the same time, Ukrainian citizens (members of the radical rightwing party UNA-UNSO) and, according to unverified reports, citizens of the Baltic countries have taken part in the war on the Georgian side. This reflects the significance of the concept of ‘Caucasian brotherhood’ for the overwhelming majority of Abkhaz on the one hand and Georgia’s commitment to a policy of Euro-Atlanticism on the other.

Views are divided, not to say diametrically opposed, over the participation of volunteers from the North Caucasus in the 1992-93 Georgian-Abkhaz war and the role they played in it, no more so than when their motives are concerned. Those who witnessed and were directly involved in the events on the Abkhaz side have no doubt that they were motivated by the desire to come to the assistance of a brotherly people, outnumbered and facing a deadly threat. In Georgia, however, public opinion and the expert community are convinced that they were simply hired mercenaries fighting for reward. This article attempts to identify the motives of the people who came to help the people of Abkhazia.

2. The start of the war: the role of public organisations and leaders in the North Caucasus

In the first few days following the Georgian military’s incursion into Abkhazia in August 1992, which resulted in mass looting, killing on the basis of ethnicity and acts of repression initially aimed at the Abkhaz, but later extended to include the entire non-Georgian populace within the republic, many people believed that a Georgian victory was a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the Abkhaz military, greatly outnumbered and outgunned by the Georgian forces, appeared to be confined to a small patch of territory extending from the river Gumista to the village of Kolkhida. However a partisan movement was developing within the besieged city of Tkvarchal and some villages in Ochamchira district. Moscow’s policy, which was opaque and highly contradictory, was hardly designed to reassure the non-Georgian population and they felt, with good reason, that governments all around the world were backing Shevardnadze. For their part, the leaders and activists of the Abkhaz national movement and those leaders from the Armenian, Slav and Greek communities that supported them hoped – rightly, as it turned out - that their North Caucasus cousins would not simply stand by and watch Abkhazia being brought to its knees.

The policy of perestroika and democratisation had given the Abkhaz the opportunity to ‘re-discover’ for themselves their ethnically and culturally close relatives the Adyghes as well as other peoples living in the North Caucasus. Not, of course, that there had been no contact at all between the Abkhaz and Adyghe during the ‘era of stagnation’, but generally Moscow and Tbilisi had tried to steer clear of encouraging too much rapprochement, given the ‘problems’ that the Abkhaz were already causing the central authorities from time to time[1].

Exchange visits between Abkhaz and Adyghes, arts festivals and youth campaigns combined to have an enormous moral and political impact on both Abkhazia and the North Caucasus. As these peoples rediscovered each other and became increasingly aware of how much linked them – common origins, a shared history and culture – they began to wonder about a Caucasian identity. This rapprochement had been instigated by national movements: the Popular Front ‘Aydgylara’ in Abkhazia and the International Circassian Association, the Kabardinian National Congress, the Adyghe Khase etc. in the republics of the North Caucasus. In August 1989 these and other public organisations met in Sukhum and created the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus which proclaimed itself the historical successor to the Republic of the North Caucasus2. This happened, significantly, shortly after the tragic events of July 1989 in Abkhazia, the first time a Georgian-Abkhaz clash led to blood being shed. It made it clear that further escalation of violence in Abkhazia was a distinct possibility, and the Abkhaz started to look around for potential allies. On 1-2 November 1991 the Third Assembly of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus held in Sukhum proclaimed the launch of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (KGNK). The assembly was attended by 211 representatives of the Abaza, Abkhaz, Avar, Agin, Aukhov-Chechen, Adyghe, Balkarian, Circassian, Darghin, Kabarda, Karachaev, Lak, North-Ossetian, Shapsug and South Ossetian peoples. (These founder-members joined the KGNK in the capacity of ‘peoples’ rather than ‘republics’). Sukhum was proclaimed the headquarters of the KGNK and Mussa (Yuriy) Shanibov, a Kabardinian, and Yusup Soslambekov, a Chechen, were elected as leaders. The assembly passed an Appeal to all ‘peoples and parliaments of the Caucasus’ calling on them ‘to support the idea of a Confederative Union of the peoples of the Caucasus – the only Union capable of forming the basis for inter-ethnic agreement in the region and resolving socio-economic problems’3.
The KGNK’s initial objectives were ethnic and cultural but it later turned its attention to political demands such as raising the political status of the ethnic groupings who had joined the association and restoring the unified Mountain Republic within the Russian Confederation. In response to instability in the North Caucasus and armed conflicts in the South Caucasus the KGNK set up its own armed forces which, as Yuriy Shanibov expressed it, could have functioned rather like the UN ‘blue helmets’ and helped to support peace and stability in the North Caucasus.

The KGNK’s objectives and slogans were, understandably, radicalised following the start of the Georgian-Abkhaz war. In the very first days of the war Vladislav Ardzinba, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia, appealed to the administrations and peoples of the republics of the North Caucasus to provide immediate assistance to Abkhazia. Calling on the administration and peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria he stated: ‘In its hour of deadly peril the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia appeals to the President of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic and the fraternal peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria to provide assistance with all the means at their disposal’4.

Ardzinba’s call did not go unheeded. Following emergency meetings held in the evening of 14 August the Kabardinian public organisations ‘Adyghe Khase’, the ‘Kabardinian National Congress’ (KNC) and others passed declarations and appeals criticising the aggression of troops under the Georgian State Council against the people of Abkhazia and demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Georgian State Council troops from Abkhazia. An appeal was also made to the Russian administration to take concrete measures to resolve the situation in Abkhazia. The International Circassian Association (ICA) also appealed to the Adyghe and Abaza peoples and the South Russian Cossacks, saying, ‘We shall not abandon Abkhazia in its hour of need! The International Circassian Association issues an urgent call for volunteers to defend our cousins the Abkhaz people’. On 17 August 1992 a session of the KGNK’s parliament was convened in Grozny under the political slogan: ‘Hands off Abkhazia!’. Similar demands were seen at large public demonstrations in Kabardino-Balkaria, Daghestan and Adygheya.

The KGNK was thus a firm ally for Abkhazia as it entered into war with Georgia. As rightly pointed out by Aleksandr Krylov, ‘these actions by the Georgian administration appeared blatantly unjust to the people of the former USSR, leading to the influx into Abkhazia of many volunteers who came to fight for the Abkhaz against the Georgian army (Ossetians, Transnistrians, Russians, Chechens etc.). These volunteers fought within international divisions, although the South Russia Cossacks fought under their own separate military units’5. One of the first to respond to the call was Aleksandr Bardodum, a talented 25-year-old Moscow poet who had studied under the Abkhaz Translation Group at the Literary Institute, who fought under Shamil’ Basayev. It may come as a surprise to some that the volunteer fighters in these divisions came from a very wide range of peoples, mainly from the North Caucasus and Southern Russia, both Muslim and Christian. Abkhazia was defended by Chechens and Cossacks, Kabardinians and Balkarians, Circassians and Karachaevans, Ossetians and Ingush, with no ethnic or religious conflicts or tension arising between them.

3. The position of the various political forces in relation to Abkhazia

Since the Abkhaz armed forces, along with the majority of the civilian population, were concentrated in the Gudauta district and were completely encircled by State Council troops on the Sukhum and Gagra sides, it was very difficult for the first groups of volunteers to enter Abkhazia. They included Kabardinians (Ibragim Yaganov, Aleksey Bekshokov and others), the Chechen Shamil Basayev and many others. Only a few of the volunteers were armed, with most hoping to pick up weapons on the spot in Abkhazia. Since Georgian assault troops already controlled all major routes, they could only enter Abkhazia via mountain passes. On the basis of memoirs written by generals Gennady Troshev and Anatoly Kulikov, the Russian researcher Oleg Lukin states that the Russian police attempted to detain a group of Chechen volunteers heading for Abkhazia in the Pyatigorsk area. The Chechens took some bus passengers hostage and used them as a ‘human shield’ to break through the border into Abkhazia. Kulikov goes on to say that Russian special forces set up an ambush in the mountains aimed at freeing the hostages and disarming the militants, but a command came ‘from higher up’ to allow them to proceed 6.

So why did Moscow decide to allow volunteers from the North Caucasus to come to the assistance of the Abkhaz? To answer this question we need to go back to the events which were occurring at the time in both Moscow and the North Caucasus. President Yeltsin’s protracted conflict with the Supreme Soviet headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov meant in practice that there was a dual administration, as a result of which the situation in the Russian capital explosive. Yeltsin’s position on the incursion of Georgian troops into Abkhazia was diametrically opposed to that of the overwhelming majority of deputies in the Russian Supreme Soviet. Whereas Yeltsin was willing to try anything to maintain good relations with Shevardnadze, principally to secure Georgia’s membership of the CIS, even if it was against Abkhazia’s interests, the Russian Supreme Soviet had on more than one occasion publicly criticised Georgia’s actions and demanded the withdrawal of Georgian troops.

Naturally, the development of the situation in the North Caucasus in connection with the events in Abkhazia was bound to worry the Russian administration and at the end of August 1992 the Russian Vice-President Aleksander Rutskoy met the leaders of the North Caucasus republics to discuss what was happening. Here it is important to remember that perestroika and glasnost, as well as reviving hopes of an ethnic and cultural revival by the peoples of the North Caucasus, had also allowed radicalist and separatist movements to emerge (particularly clearly in Chechnya). This was bound to be of concern to Moscow. The dramatic events in Abkhazia, as mentioned earlier, were also fomenting unrest across the whole of the North Caucasus. Georgia’s actions and Moscow’s failure to act particularly alarmed Abkhazia’s cousins, the Circassians, Adyghe and Abaza. Protests at the actions of the Georgian ‘imperialists’ were, quite logically, extended to encompass Moscow’s at times erratic Caucasus policy which was met in the North Caucasus (and primarily in Chechnya) with growing alarm over the potential for repressive measures by Federal authorities. This combined to increase destabilisation in this ethnically and religiously complex region.

On the other hand subjective factors also played a role, in particular the negative attitude of many in the Russian military to Shevardnadze, whom as former head of the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs they blamed for the rapid withdrawal, not to say rout, of the Russian military from Germany. This had led to soldiers having to be accommodated in tents, virtually in the open countryside.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, then, did not just threaten the stability of the North Caucasus but also drew the attention of ethnic nationalist zealots  in the North Caucasus republics to what had happened in Abkhazia. And the Russian administration, along with the regional leaders, were nevertheless just as concerned that the situation around Abkhazia might develop and quite justifiably feared that the Georgian-Abkhaz armed conflict might spill over into Russian territory. Thus on 20 August 1992 an extraordinary meeting of leaders of the republics, territories and oblasts of the North Caucasus was convened in the city of Armavir in Krasnodar Territory to discuss the situation in the North Caucasus that had arisen as a result of the military action in Abkhazia. A delegation was formed at the meeting to hold negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation on how to resolve the emergency situation in the North Caucasus. The participants of the meeting issued an Appeal to the President of the Russian Federation BorisYeltsin and the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation Ruslan Khasbulatov which noted that ‘the events in Abkhazia could spread to the North Caucasus region and lead to civil war in Southern Russia’. The appeal also referred to ‘the need for a rapid political resolution of the military conflict in Abkhazia and the withdrawal of troops from its territory. ‘To resolve this humanitarian problem the Russian administration must undertake a peacebuilding mission and employ all its international authority to this end’7.

However, the response of the Russian administration was to completely ignore the view of the leaders of the republics of the North Caucasus and the majority of deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. It continued its handover of Soviet arms held in the arsenals of the Transcaucasian Military District to the Georgian State Council despite the Council’s flagrant violation of its commitment not to use these arms against the civilian population which Georgia, along with the other former Soviet republics, had undertaken in Tashkent when the former Soviet Army’s weaponry was redistributed. On 21 September, Vladislav Ardzinba, Chair of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia, sent a letter to the Russian President Boris Yeltsin stating: ‘The administration of Georgia, in contravention of all the articles of the Moscow Agreement, is building up its military power. Just a few days ago Georgia again received a large contingent of arms from the arsenals of the Russian Combined Forces. There is every reason to believe that Defence Minister Kitovani’s threat to move to decisive action in the near future is entirely feasible. Georgia is preparing a strike with SU-27 fighter aircraft equipped with bombs and air-to-ground missiles in the Gudauta district where the Abkhaz population resides and a significant number of refugees is concentrated, as well as in the Ochamchira district and the city of Tkvarchal. The fighter crews, bombs and missiles have already arrived at Sukhum airport. If the Georgian administration proceeds this will lead to large numbers of civilian victims and make the situation ungovernable. I appeal to you for assistance in bringing about the immediate withdrawal of State Council troops from the territory of the Republic of Abkhazia’8. Russia’s response was to complete the transfer of the Akhaltsikhe motorised infantry division to Georgia on 22 September.

The Russian administration’s position is clearly demonstrated by the statement issued by the Russian government regarding the legality of the KGNK’s participation in the Georgia-Abkhazia war. On 25 August the Russian Ministry of Justice declared that the actions of the Confederation were illegal and in flagrant violation of the Constitution. On 27 August the Russian Public Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings against the KGNK on charges of inciting inter-ethnic hatred, committing acts of terrorism and sabotage and hostage-taking. ‘Tbilisi viewed with satisfaction the statement of the Russian Minister of Justice Fedorov that the Conference of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was an illegal organisation and that criminal proceedings were being instituted against it. In response to this, rather bizarrely, it was reported in the press that the KGNK had announced that it would initiate criminal proceedings against the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and the Justice Minister B. Fedorov for ‘inciting inter-ethnic hatred between peoples’. However an official denial was quickly issued by the KGNK’9 .

The events in Abkhazia also presented the leaders of the North Caucasus republics with a difficult choice. They clearly had to take account of public opinion and calls from the more politicised groupings in their societies to rush to Abkhazia’s aid immediately. However, announcing an initiative to provide assistance to Abkhazia or for that matter simply failing to prevent volunteers arriving from their republics would seriously damage their careers. Sergei Markedonov, analysing the behaviour of presidents from the different North Caucasus republics, notes that they responded in different ways. The President of Kabardino-Balkaria, Valery Kokov, adopted a very cautious position and did not respond to the KGNK’s demand that he support the people of Abkhazia in its fight with Georgia. The actions of the Russian Prosecutor-General’s office which led to the KGNK’s leader Yuriy Shanibov being arrested on 23 September 1992 in Nalchik sparked a serious political crisis in the republic with clashes between the police and the Kabardinian National Congress and the KGNK. In September 1992 the KNC was bandying slogans on Kabardiya’s secession from Russia and the withdrawal of Russian troops and special forces units from its territory. On 27 September 1992 a state of emergency was decreed in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria. The republic’s president Valery Kokov spoke out strongly against the demonstrators and appealed to the Russian administration to send Russian internal troops to Nalchik. In October 1992 the demonstrations were dispersed.

At the same time the Adygheyan president Aslan Dzharimov came out more or less openly in support of Ardzinba and responded to his call to send volunteers to Abkhazia. The Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev, despite providing military assistance, criticised the Abkhaz as too pro-Russian. The other leaders of the republics, Vladimir Khubiyev, an ethnic Karachayevan  (Karachaevo-Cherkessia) and Akhsarbek Galazov (North Ossetia) made no response to the call, although a number of volunteers from these republics arrived at their own initiative in Abkhazia. Sergei Markedonov, referring to this diversity of responses by leaders of the republics calls it ‘a situation caused by Russia’s multiplicity of interests and its policy of keeping its options open during the open phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict’10.
These differences surfaced most publicly at a meeting in Moscow on 3 September 1992 which was televised and followed very closely in Abkhazia and whose ‘Final Document’ was widely discussed in the territories controlled by the Abkhaz side. It was obvious that unprecedented pressure had been brought to bear on Vladislav Ardzinba by Yeltsin and his entourage, whose position was openly pro-Georgia. The Abkhaz delegation at the Moscow meeting and indeed Abkhaz society as a whole objected to provisions in the document that included a demand that ‘illegal military formations and groups’ be disbanded and withdrawn from Abkhazia and prevented from returning in future (Art. 1). This was clearly a reference to the volunteer divisions. Moreover, Art. 11 stated that ‘the authorities and administrations of the republics, territories and oblasts of the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation will take effective measures to prevent any acts from their territories that contravene the provisions of this agreement’. If it had signed this document, the Abkhaz side would have dealt a blow to those people who had come to the assistance of the people of Abkhazia, something that was completely unacceptable from a moral point of view. Consequently the head of the Abkhaz delegation Vladislav Ardzinba announced at the meeting that he would not agree to these provisions: ‘I will insert my own view in the margin, since I cannot, either from a moral or legal standpoint, criticise people who came to Abkhazia to sacrifice their lives for the Abkhaz people, for all the peoples of Abkhazia…I will insert my own view regarding Article 11 when I sign the document’11. 

4. The significance of the volunteer movement

In Abkhazia today the support provided by the peoples of the North Caucasus and the Cossacks of South Russia in its hour of need is seen as highly significant. The Abkhaz philosopher and expert Oleg Damenia says ‘without such powerful support from the North Caucasus peoples and members of our diaspora, I am not sure what the outcome of this war would have been. I am not at all sure we could have withstood the onslaught. I don’t just mean the military reinforcements that came from the North Caucasus, though these were significant. I also have in mind the moral and particularly the political components of this support. And I am referring here not just the people who came here to fight on the Abkhaz side but also all the peoples of the North Caucasus region who gave their unqualified support to Abkhazia. This was an extremely important factor. The political administration in Russia, whatever its view of the events occurring at the time in the Caucasus, had to consider the political mood in the North Caucasus region. That political mood was created by those people who stood side by side with our warriors’ 12.
This assistance is valued just as highly by the Abkhaz historian Stanislav Lakoba who remarked that ‘when all the borders around Abkhazia were closed and our enemies said that even a bird could not fly through them, and Shevardnadze was announcing that the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was simply a paper fiction, representatives of the North Caucasus came to Abkhazia by all conceivable and inconceivable routes. They stood alongside us, fought, perished, became heroes of our war. All this played a role since they became increasingly active after ’89, after the July events. I am referring to the Constituent Assembly in the early days of the Assembly of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which later went on to become a serious political force. For Abkhazia, particular in the first days of the war, this represented enormous moral and psychological support – people came on foot from all the republics of the Caucasus through mountain passes, and what is more they were genuine volunteers, not mercenaries as people have tried to make them out to be. Throughout the war the volunteers accounted for no more than 10% of our army, but their contribution to our victory cannot be overstated. They included Sultan Sosnaliyev, Mokhammed Kilba, Gamzat Khankarov, Yusup Soslanbekov, Mussa Shanibov and indeed Shamil Basayev and his group. They all played a very big part, they are all people on whom we counted. Without this North Caucasus factor, which the Georgians underestimated, I think that it would have been very difficult for us to hold out. As it turned out, the Abkhaz were quite right to create the Confederation, and the fact that on the eve of the war Sukhum was proclaimed the Confederation’s capital is also highly significant’13.

 ххх

An analysis of these events preceding the war: the contacts made between the Abkhaz, Adyghe and other peoples of the North Caucasus; the movement for Caucasian unity which arose in the early ’90s; the creation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (later renamed the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus), is compelling evidence that the volunteers were in fact motivated by ideology rather than profit. Significantly, many of those who took part in or witnessed these events recalled the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. The Abkhaz writer Dzhuma Akhuba, addressing his call to the Russian intelligentsia, writes: ‘Remember the heroic deeds… of Hemingway, Ehrenburg and Koltsov, who fought with the pen and the sword for the freedom and independence of other peoples, who fought fascism in foreign countries!’. An analogy with the Spanish War is also drawn by Anna Broydo, who worked in Abkhazia during the war as a war journalist. She writes: ‘…The volunteers were always quick to emphasise that their actions were not motivated by profit and for them there was no insult worse than ‘mercenary’14.

______________________

[1] I am referring here to a number of mass popular protests in Abkhazia at Georgia’s assimilationist policy.
2 This consisted in 1918 of 7 ‘autonomous states’ – Daghestan, Chechen-Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachaevo-Balkariya, Kabarda, Adygheya and Abkhazia. However the Republic did not last long. It was replaced in 1920 by the Autonomous Mountain Republic, which only extended from Kabarda to Chechnya, but this also turned out to be infeasible and was abolished in 1924. (For more details, see V. Berozovsky and V. Chervyakov, ‘Konfederatsiya gorskikh narodov Kavkaza’ [The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus] mhtml:file://E:/3_06_HTM.mht.)
3 Ibid.
4 The newspaper ‘Respublika’, Nalchik. 22. 08. 1992.
5 A. Krylov, Uroki gruzino-abkhazskoy voiny. Rol’ Moskvy i Tbilisi, [The lessons of the Georgian-Abkhaz war. The role of Moscow and Tbilisi] in the internet journal ‘Novaya politika’, 17 May 2005
6 O. Lukin, Chechensky factor v gruzino-abkhazskoy voyne 1992 -1993 [The Chechen factor in the 1992-1993Georgian-Abkhaz war], http://voinenet.ru/voina/istoriya-voiny/844.html
7 Quoted from A.V. Kushkhabiev,  Kabardino-Balkariya i gruzino-abkhazsky vooruzhenny konflikt [Kabardino-Balkaria and the Georgian-Abkhaz armed conflict], Nal’chik, 2006 No..3, pp. 344-370
8 More details can be found in K. Myalo, Rossiya i poslyednye voyny XX veka, [Russia and the last wars of the 20th century], www.patriotica.ru/actual/myalo_wars_.html 
9 Quoted from: V. Berozovsky and V. Chervyakov, in ‘Konfederatsiya gorskikh narodov Kavkaza’ [The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus] mhtml:file://E:/3_06_HTM.mht.)
10 Sergey Markedonov, Interesy Rossii v Abkhazii i Gruzii i puti ikh osushchestvleniya [Russian interests in Abkhazia and Georgia and how they are realised] in Aspekty gruzino-abkhazskogo konflikta [Aspects of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict], edition 12, Irvine, 2006, pp. 25 – 26.
11 Russia-Georgia. Concluding document from the Moscow meeting on 3 September 1992, russia.bestpravo.ru/fed1992/data02/tex12083.htm
12 Interview conducted with O. Dameniya in Sukhum in September 2011
13 Interview conducted with St. Lakoba in Sukhum in September 2011
14 A.I. Broido, Proyavlenie etnopsyikhologicheskikh osobennostey abkhazov v khode Otechestvennoy voyny naroda Abkhazii 1992-1993 [The emergence of the ethno-psychological characteristics of Abkhaz during the 1992-1993 Patriotic War of the people of Abkhazia ]. Moscow 2008, p. 148. 

The article was written in the framework of International Alert’s ‘Dialogue through Research’ project on the theme of the ‘The North-Caucasus Factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Dynamic’

Wednesday 23 May 2012

The Circassian question and Abkhazia: historical factors and contemporary challenges by Arda Inal-Ipa

Preamble
The situation in the Russian Caucasus has deteriorated significantly over the last two decades. This is mainly as a result of the events in Chechnya and because the problems of the North-Western Caucasus region, populated by the Circassian (Adyghe) people, have resurfaced to become a key factor. The history of the “Circassian question” in Russia goes back to the conquest of the Caucasus in the 19th century. Despite some fairly lengthy periods of peace, the problems of the Russian West Caucasus have never really gone away: to this day, the Circassian people remain scattered across a number of different republics and “territorial-administrative units”; the creation of a standardised literary language remains unresolved; there is still no procedure in place for the return of Circassian refugees from the time of the Caucasian War to their homeland; and much else besides. The Circassian question has been linked with Abkhazia almost from the start. The Abkhaz and Adyghe peoples have interacted closely at various historical periods, mainly since they are genetically related and have lived in close proximity to one another for thousands of years. Events in the recent past, when brigades from the North Caucasus came to fight in the Abkhaz side  in the 1992–1993 Georgian-Abkhaz war, have again shown that they are close allies. But today, in peacetime, new and more complex aspects of the Circassian question are emerging that concern relations between the Abkhaz and the Adyghe peoples. This article attempts to analyse this aspect of the problem, in order to identify and understand the sources of the challenges concerning the two societies today.

One of the difficulties in writing this article is that it covers  the most  “fresh” trends, which have not yet been subjected to academic theories and research. The problems in Abkhaz-Circassian relations are still at an embryonic stage. Attempts to investigate the origins of some misunderstandings and contradictions  are thus all the more urgently needed if we are to identify the action required to increase understanding between the societies before negative attitudes  can form.

This is important not only for the future of bilateral relations, but also in view of the urgent need for confidence building between the peoples to support stability in the Caucasus, given the fragility of the current period of peace. The Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian wars may no longer be raging, but they did not end completely with the signing of peace treaties and agreements on the non-resumption of hostilities.  

Methodology
This article focuses on the North-Western Caucasus, on materials connected with the Circassians (Adyghe), and on the Abkhaz and the history of their recent relations as part of the Russian Empire, the USSR and in current conditions. The article does not consider how the situation has been affected by the events in Chechnya and across the North-Eastern Caucasus. These factors, although very important, are too complex to be analysed here. Instead, we examine the historical record from the 19th and 20th centuries and reflect on its consequences and effects on Circassian-Abkhaz relations, as well as a number of problems currently facing relations between Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia.

Historical factors
Public discussions on the historical past – and particularly relations between the peoples of the Caucasus and Russia – ebb and flow under the influence of events in the North Caucasus. Although a century and a half has passed since the end of the Caucasian War, the current situation clearly continues to be dogged by events from that period. Some would go so far as to say that the current “Circassian question” is a continuation of the Caucasian War. But wars need not always cast such a long shadow. This article attempts to come to an understanding of the specific features of Russia’s fight for the Caucasus that make revisiting this dramatic period of history so unavoidable.

     1.      The unprecedented ferocity with which the Caucasus War was waged by the Tsarist regime has made it difficult to evaluate the outcome of the war as a natural result of military conflict. To quote a description by a participant in the war, Lieutenant General R.A. Fadeyev: ‘…we had to turn the Eastern shore of the Black Sea into Russian land and to do this we had to purge the entire littoral of the mountain peoples ... We had to annihilate a significant proportion … of the population to force the rest to lay down their weapons unconditionally ... Our plan of war was to deport the mountain peoples and settle the Western Caucasus with Russians.’[1] But the testimony of another participant in the events - the military geographer M. Venyukova describes: "... the war was waged with a relentless, ruthless severity. We advanced step by step, irrevocably cleansing each piece of land on which a soldier’s foot trod of every last highlander down the to last man. Hundreds of mountain villages were razed to the ground, entire crops trampled by horses. The of villages people were immediately led away under escort and sent to the shores of the Black Sea and beyond, to Turkey."[2] The nature of warfare, which Russia waged against the peoples of the western Caucasus, was condemned by many contemporaries, and today they view the descendants of the conquered peoples as the embodiment of genocide.
     2.      Another factor that explains why the events of the 19th century remain eternally etched on the memory of the peoples of the Western Caucasus is the calls for the creation of a Circassian state that resounded at the height of resistance to the Tsarist Empire’s policies. These calls were supported by a number of European countries, in particular Great Britain, Russia’s rivals in the Caucasus and the entire Black Sea region. Questions of statehood at another level emerged in 1917, 1918, 1920, 1921 and again later – already from within the Russian Federation (incidentally, Abkhazia was also involved in most of these projects). However, plans for a state or a republican alliance uniting all the Adyghe people were short-lived.[3]  
     3.      A third important factor, in our view, was that many contemporary Russian academics and public actors have failed to come to an objective assessment of the Caucasian War. Today, some Russian historians and public figures, in contrast with their predecessors in the 19th century, justify or at least pass over in silence the extremely harsh nature of the conduct of the war in the Western Caucasus. Denying the crimes committed by Tsarist Russia in the Caucasian War effectively makes it impossible to move on from this tragic stage in history. It leaves this highly contentious topic a subject of current public discourse which taints Adygheyan attitudes to the Russian centre.
     4.      The most problematic legacy of the Caucasian war is that the default problem-solving paradigm in the North Caucasus is not to search for a compromise or common interests, but to annihilate or deport the enemy. Vestiges of this approach unfortunately seem to occasionally remain to this day and continue to have a negative effect on the situation.

The Circassian question in the present day
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most serious internal policy challenges facing the Russian state has unquestionably been Moscow’s relations with the North Caucasus republics. The well-known political commentator and diplomat Vladimir Degoyev writes: ‘The time has come to reveal a big secret. Since 1991 Russia has been steadily losing sovereignty in the North Caucasus. The exigencies of everyday life mean that the local population is increasingly failing to comply with Russian laws, which are no longer seen as the exercise of legitimate power but either as a source of income, exploitation or a source of grievance.’[4] Another well-known Russian expert on the modern Caucasus, Sergey Markedonov, describes the features of current Russian policy in the Caucasus in the following terms: ‘Entire republics have been farmed out to outwardly loyal clans who are simply required to ensure that voters in elections produce the “right” results. The country, instead of being strengthened, has been fundamentally weakened.’[5]

As already noted, the interpretation of historical events has an enormous part to play in the genesis of the Circassian problem. This makes assessments of the Caucasian War, and the manner in which these assessments are reflected in current day Russian policy in the Caucasus, of particular significance. We should include here a separate comment on the special position of the former Russian president Boris Yeltsin. Readers may recall that on the 130th anniversary of the end of the Caucasian War, on 21st May 1994, Yeltsin addressed the peoples of the Caucasus. His address contained the following words: ‘In the present day, when Russia is constructing a legal state and recognises the primacy of universal human values, there is an opportunity emerging for an objective interpretation of the events of the Caucasian War as the valiant struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus not only for survival in their native land, but also for the preservation of a distinctive culture, the best features of the national character. The problems we have inherited from the Caucasian War, and particularly the return of the descendants of the Caucasian deportees to their historical homeland, must be resolved at an international level by negotiations attended by all interested parties.’[6] In practice, the approach voiced by Yeltsin to the sensitive questions of the historical past and to contemporary policy in the Caucasus unfortunately came to nothing. In our view, this was a missed opportunity for building relations between the centre and the peoples of the Caucasus on a new, more robust basis.

An important factor in the current political processes in the North-Western Caucasus is the re-emergence of the idea of a resurgence or new version of a unified Circassian nation. This has resulted from global processes such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states, along with modern Russia’s not always entirely constructive ethnic policy. Discussions outline a number of ways this could be implemented, ranging from reuniting the people in their historical homeland within a single entity of the Russian Federation to the creation of a dispersed but spiritually and politically united nation. Other, bolder plans are also being voiced.[7]

These processes, which are extremely important in political terms in the North-Western Caucasus, ought to be the subject of intense interest from government at all levels. A reasonable response would be to take public opinion into account. In fact, however, the response is entirely different. Officials in the capitals and the regions ignore the analysis and recommendations of experts on the modern North Caucasus and are out of touch with what is actually happening on the ground. As a result, policy frameworks used in the North Caucasus are outmoded and ineffective. This is allowing a situation to develop in which the North Caucasus is becoming the subject of the foreign policy of other states, whose interest is not always to strengthen ties between the republics of the North Caucasus and the central authorities in Russia. These are certain Arab countries, Georgia, to some extent Turkey and also Western countries.

Georgia’s policy in relation to the North Caucasus
Prior to 2008, it would have been difficult to identify any systematic, consistent Georgian policy on the North Caucasus. However, after the war in South Ossetia, the North Caucasus became one of the important foreign policy “vectors” of the Georgian state. Since the escalation of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in the late 1980s, the attitudes of the peoples of the North Caucasus towards Georgia have been relatively frosty. The Georgian-Abkhaz war only deepened this mutual hostility. However, the Georgian government has adopted a number of measures on refugees from Chechnya that have made a start on improving Georgia’s relations with the eastern republics of the North Caucasus. The Adyghe are now becoming the principal subject of Georgian policy in the North Caucasus. At the same time, the Circassians’ negative attitude towards Georgia, the foundations of which were laid during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, is gradually transforming. Relations are even extending to a kind of partnership over important questions of interpretation and assessment of the political consequences of the Caucasian War, as well as the search for an acceptable future political configuration in the Caucasus. Generally, Georgia demonstrates quite innovative skills in its foreign policy actions in relation to the North Caucasus. We need only refer to decisions such as: the unilateral introduction of a selective visa-free regime for residents of the republics of the North Caucasus; the establishment of entitlements and quotas for residents of the North Caucasus relating to education or medical assistance within Georgia; the opening of the special television channel ‘First Information Caucasus’ (PIK), which broadcasts to the peoples of the North Caucasus; the recognition by the Georgian Parliament of the Circassian genocide that took place during the Caucasian War in the 19th century; the opening of a Centre of Circassian Culture; and the announcement of a tender for a memorial to the Circassian deportees.  
   
However, it is clear that the underlying aim of all these measures aimed at improving relations with the peoples of the North Caucasus is anti-Russian: seeking to weaken Moscow’s influence in the North Caucasus. In other words, virtually every action taken to improve Georgia’s relations with the peoples of the North Caucasus is undertaken to ensure that these countries’ relations with the central authorities in Moscow deteriorates. This approach is clearly not designed out of any concern for the Adyghe. Unfortunately, support from some Western circles for this policy by Georgia only renders the situation in the North Caucasus more volatile and provokes Russia to take harsh measures. Such measures in turn strengthen the positions of radical forces in the Caucasus, which are the enemy not only of Russia but also of Europe and the entire democratic world. Georgia’s policy in the North Caucasus is thus not particularly far-sighted or constructive. Its policymakers cannot see the obvious dangers lurking behind the short-term successes. Georgia will have to accept its share of responsibility for the rise in extremism in the North Caucasus and for Moscow’s predictably tough response to the strengthening of anti-Russian feeling there. Over the long term, this is unlikely to be in the interests of the peoples of the North Caucasus.

Georgia’s active policy towards the Circassians will clearly contribute negatively to Abkhaz-Circassian relations. Any action taken by Georgia that demonstrates they recognise the Circassians’ current needs, and that they respect and acknowledge their historical sufferings, will inevitably be accompanied by a warming in the Circassian-Georgian relationship. The Abkhaz take a jaundiced view of this, since in the absence of a resolution of the conflict, any improvement in relations between the republics of the North Caucasus and Georgia is seen by them as an attempt to undermine the Circassian-Abkhaz brotherhood formed during their joint struggle against the Georgians. On the other hand, the Abkhaz, who are highly dependent on Russia, do not support debates initiated by US and Georgian think tanks with an anti-Russian slant -  for example, discussions on the genocide of the Circassians during the Caucasian War, on the inadmissibility of holding the Olympics in Sochi, etc. The position of the Abkhaz is met by blank incomprehension by some in the Circassian community. We should note here that the position adopted by Abkhazia on this does not mean it is entirely uncritical of the dramatic aspects of the Caucasus’ past and present. On the contrary, criticism of Russia’s Caucasian policy is commonly heard in Abkhaz public discourse. However, a clear distinction is made in Abkhazia between the Tsarist  policies and the present. A further distinction is made between the mistakes and omissions of Russia’s current policy in the North-Western Caucasus and the positive steps taken by them. Although they understand all the problems and share the concerns of the Adyghe people, the Abkhaz will never be able to change their view of the Russian Federation’s 2008 recognition of the independence of the Abkhaz state. This decision was taken by Russia even though it was obvious it would have serious consequences for its relations with Western countries, not to mention Georgia. But it is not simply Abkhazia’s high regard for this recognition and gratitude for the enormous economic and financial assistance from Russia that prevent it from joining in with anti-Russian public relations campaigns. People in Abkhazia are clear that historical justice should be achieved  not through undermining relations between the republics of the North Caucasus and Moscow, but by solving  the difficult task of searching for mutual understanding and compromise without jeopardising the fragile stability of the North Caucasus.     

The emergence of thorny issues  in Circassian-Abkhaz relations
Once Abkhazia’s alliance with Russia was strengthened by the recognition of its independence, it could have played a significant role in removing thorny aspects of the relations  between the republics of the North Caucasus and Moscow. However, while Abkhazia was still considering how best to use the available resources to positive effect, the first signs of cracks in Abkhaz-Circassian relations unexpectedly appeared.

The first alarm signals
Warning signs started to emerge following the decision by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to hold the Winter Olympics in Sochi. The Abkhaz supported the idea. However, the Circassians, particularly the Circassian diaspora, began to question whether it was acceptable to hold the games on territory which had witnessed the most ferocious battles between Tsarist troops and Circassian divisions. The Abkhaz did not join the protests of some Circassian organisations abroad.[8] Instead, they suggested that the games should be used as an opportunity to draw attention to the historical past and the present-day problems of the peoples who, before the Caucasian War, had lived on the land on which the Olympic Games were due to be held. This was counter to the attitudes of the most radical members of the campaign against the Sochi Olympics. Other highly contentious issues were added to the campaign which had nothing to do with Circassian-Russian relations, but addressed relations between the peoples of the Caucasus themselves. Questions of Circassian and Abkhaz identity unexpectedly cropped up,[9] along with problems of interpretation of certain historical facts, disputes over which territorial unit certain regions should be assigned to – and much more. Issues that should rightly only be the subject of rigorous academic research were disputed publicly over the internet in discussions that were cleverly manipulated by interested parties and not always impartial. Dilettante attempts to conduct “historical investigations” into contentious issues only succeed in aggravating discord and grievances as well as misapplying disagreements over the historical past to current realities.

The question of Abkhaz citizenship
One hotly discussed issue – mainly within the Circassian diaspora, but also on history websites, in social networks and in periodicals – is the Abkhaz citizenship law. This law states that apart from residents permanently residing in Abkhazia, only ethnic Abkhaz, Abaza and (since recently) Ubykhs are entitled by right of birth to be citizens of the Republic of Abkhazia.  This has offended many Circassians, who according to various estimates total seven or even 10 million people, since it means that the Circassians are the only people out of the kindred nations who are denied the right to citizenship of the Abkhaz state (the only state in the Abkhaz/Adyghe space). This is despite the fact that 2,500 Circassians defended the fledgling Abkhaz state on the battlefield and hundreds laid down their lives for Abkhazia’s freedom.

The question of the genocide of the Circassian peoples during the Caucasian War
The essence of the disagreements over the recognition of the genocide of the Circassian people can be summarised as follows. The Resolution of the Parliament of the Republic of Abkhazia on 15th November 1997 on the deportations resulting from the Caucasian War only refers to the Abaza/Abkhaz; the question of recognising the genocide of the Adyghe people was not considered. On the other hand, the Abkhaz public responded negatively to the ecstatic public welcome given by some Circassians to the Georgian Parliament’s Resolution recognising the genocide of the Circassians by the Russian Empire during the Caucasian War, which was passed on 20th May 2011.

We would argue that the emergence of these contentious issues is not merely a coincidence, but the result of serious differences in how the Abkhaz and the Circassians view their national project and divergences in basic understandings of identity. Without an understanding of the origin of these differences, it is impossible to understand and hence overcome the misunderstandings and resentments that have arisen. We attempt here to touch on these questions briefly.



Divergences between the national projects of the Abkhaz and the Adyghe
The launch of the Abkhaz national liberation movement at the end of the 20th century was originally viewed by the peoples of the North Caucasus as providing an impetus towards the construction of a North-West Caucasus state. However, subsequent events – particularly the deterioration of Abkhaz-Circassian relations over the last year – have shown that the national projects that the Abkhaz and the Circassians have been fomenting for years and even decades are fundamentally different. The Abkhaz have never been in any doubt that the purpose of their struggle is to defend their right to an independent Abkhaz state. Conversely, many Circassians saw an independent Abkhazia not so much as an example to follow, but the basis for the creation of a common Circassian state. In this view, the Abkhaz were expected to join in the building of a pan-Circassian state and, as a people related to the Circassians, were seen by many as part of a nascent Circassian (political) nation.[10] Moreover, some Circassian leaders had begun to formulate new ideas of a Western Caucasus community that included not just Circassians and Abkhaz, but also Georgia as the closest country to the Abkhaz-Adyghe in terms of civilisation. This was entirely incomprehensible and unacceptable to the Abkhaz.[11] As long as Georgia promotes its claim to Abkhazia, these tendencies will be seen as a serious threat within Abkhazia.

The question of identity
At this point, we should consider the lack of clarity over some aspects of how Abkhaz and Circassian identity is perceived and defined. In Abkhazia, people have always “known” that the Adyghe (Adygheyans, Circassians and Kabardinians), Ubykhs and Abkhaz form a group of related peoples within an Abkhaz-Adyghe group, and these are peoples with independent languages which could only have formed through prolonged, separate historical development. However, many present-day Circassians have a completely different view. The overwhelming majority of Circassian publications unhesitatingly classify the Ubykhs as Circassians, along with others such as the Abkhaz/Abaza. In other words, the ethnonym “Circassian” is generally used to refer to the Circassians, the Ubykh and the Abaza/Abkhaz. However, although the Abkhaz place a high value on their kinship with the Circassians, Abkhaz identity, which is based also on its independent language and its separate historical path, has never been seen by them as submerged within any other identity, including Circassian. This difference in understanding these terms, which is important both for individual identity and for the ethnos, was bound to lead to a lack of understanding and even resentment.  

Do any resources exist for positive change?
Despite these unexpected difficulties, which cannot be underestimated, we believe that Abkhazia still has the potential to positively influence the situation to overcome conflicts and build confidence between the Circassian North Caucasus and Abkhazia. In our view, the way to counter the destructive processes in relations between the two is not to ignore them, but instead to air these issues through in-depth discussion and interpretation of them at academic research institutions and in civil society. We would recommend that a number of educational initiatives be adopted, involving young people studying the history of the Caucasian War, the Soviet era and the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Academic and practical conferences could have a positive effect. In the present circumstances, efforts to educate societies  could become most effective through civil society , given the greater activeness  of civil society organisations and opportunities for networking.

We believe that Abkhazia could also contribute in some measure towards increasing mutual understanding between Circassian society and the Russian central authorities. It seems essential to us to establish an open dialogue between society and the authorities at various levels in which representatives of Abkhazia could also take part. This process could be developed as part of the general democratisation of political life in the republics of the North Caucasus. It would require the strengthening of civil society institutions and development of forms of civic participation. Here too, Abkhaz experience could be used. Strengthening real democracy would gradually help to replace the currently ineffective authoritarian forms of governance in the Russian Caucasus. Activating civil society and developing civil society dialogue with the authorities would help to stabilise the political situation, which is in the interest of both Russia and Abkhazia. Building the trust of the North Caucasus republics in the central authorities is also in the interests of them both. This is important for Abkhazia, as strengthening links between the republics of the North Caucasus and Abkhazia in this context would not be met with caution and distrust by Moscow. Moscow’s attitude to the patterns of contemporary Abkhaz politics is ambivalent. On the one hand, the Abkhaz elite’s wayward pursuit of “too much” independence creates, from a Russian perspective, an alarming example for the republics of the North Caucasus. On the other hand, the high levels of loyalty shown to Russia not only by the Abkhaz authorities, but by Abkhaz society itself could be a serious resource and a stabilising influence on the situation in the North Caucasus.

The constellation of forces in the North-West Caucasus following the Georgian-Abkhaz war clearly cannot be preserved forever. Despite understandable emotions, Abkhazia needs to realise that the North Caucasus peoples have their own interests, which are not always identical to those of the Abkhaz. It cannot expect its friends to stick by it forever simply because it needs them. Abkhazia needs to come up with compromises and a considered policy towards the peoples of the North Caucasus, who did after all come to its aid in its time of need. It should also devise a formula that would be acceptable to both sides for obtaining Abkhaz citizenship and recognise the harsh consequences of the Caucasian War, not just for the Abkhaz/Abaza but also for the other peoples of the North Caucasus, and much, much more. On the other hand, it is also true that, while they are fully entitled to develop relations with Georgia, the Circassian organisations could have played a more active role in persuading the Georgian authorities to sign with Abkhazia the Agreement on Non-Resumption of Hostilities. At this stage, the Circassians could possibly play a significant and historic peacebuilding role in the Caucasus. 

Conclusion
The policies adopted by the various players in the North Caucasus are unfortunately overshadowed in many respects by the past. This is seen most clearly in the outmoded frames of reference used to define their own interests, based as they are on realities that prevailed during the Caucasian and Crimean Wars of the 19th century. Today, the rivalry between Russia and the West in the North Caucasus is having a destructive effect on the situation. Instead of drawing lessons from history, when Western attempts to weaken Russian influence in the region only served to aggravate the situation, Georgia has carried on the tradition by supporting elements of anti-Russian feeling in the North Caucasus. This is a hazardous policy, which could lead to the serious destabilisation of the situation across the region. Opponents of the Russian state are using the Olympics to revive historical trauma and reverse the positive steps that the new Russia has in fact taken. At the same time, Russia is itself squandering the opportunity to correct the mistakes and omissions of the past. Remaining silent or ignoring the new direction that political and public discourses are taking in the North Caucasus prevents these processes from being analysed and interpreted openly. This drastically reduces the scope for the central authorities to make adequate conciliatory steps  that would help to reduce tension and strengthen state institutions.

In some respects, this is a sort of a war for the choice of civilisation in the North Caucasus. Russia and the West could well be allies in this process, given their pressing need to secure regional stability. Unfortunately, Georgia is playing an unconstructive role in the North Caucasus which is merely increasing the discord between the peoples of the North Caucasus and the Russian central authorities by exacerbating mutual distrust, with all the consequences that entails.

Russia must also share some responsibility for these negative trends. Instead of attempting to understand and take into account the emerging interests of the peoples of the North Caucasus, it has chosen an inflexible authoritarian approach to its Caucasus policy which is often outmanoeuvred by the innovative public relations methods adopted by the Georgian government.

Over the last few years, particularly since August 2008, there has thus been a new twist in the geopolitical struggle for influence in the Caucasus. This difficult situation is putting a strain on Abkhaz-Circassian relations. If they are to avoid becoming pawns in this great geopolitical game, the Abkhaz and Circassian peoples need to understand that it is the peoples themselves who bear primary responsibility for maintaining these relations. When considering any new political act or any response to external initiatives, they should avoid anything that might in the short or long term upset the balance of power or destabilise the Caucasus, as this is clearly not in the interests of any and all of the peoples residing in the Caucasus.


[1] R.A. Fadeyev (2003). ‘Kavkazskaya voyna’ [The Caucasian War], Moscow.
[2] M.I. Veniukov . "Kavkazskie vospominaniya" [Memories from the Caucasus] (1861-63). "Russki Archive " [Russin Archive] 1880. 1-4.
[3] Thus, for example, in November 1917 the Union of United Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus and Dagestan proclaimed the state of a Mountain Republic. However, the parliament of the Mountain Republic rapidly announced its own dissolution after Dagestan was taken by troops under General Denikin. Then, in 1918, when it was already incorporated within the RSFSR, a North Caucasus Soviet Republic was proclaimed, combining seven states: Dagestan, Checheno-Ingushetia, Ossetia, Karachaevo-Balkariya, Kabarda, Adygheya and Abkhazia. The republic lasted just six months. In 1920, the Autonomous Mountain Republic was established, which extended only from Kabarda to Chechnya and which also turned out to be infeasible: it was liquidated in 1924.
[4] V. Degoyev. ‘Kavkazsky vopros i budushcheye Rossii’ [The Caucasus question and the future of Russia]. Available (in Russian) at http://www.regnum.ru/news/1463877.html
[5] S. Markedonov. ‘Kavkazkaya proektsiya vlastnoi rokirovki v Rossii’ [Caucasian projection of castling power in Russia]. Polit.ru, 30 September 2011. Available at http://polit.ru/article/2011/09/30/Caucas
[6] Address to the peoples of the Caucasus by the Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin on the occasion of the 130th anniversary of the end of the Caucasian War, Moscow, 18th May 1994 (ITAR-TASS).
[7] R. Keshev. ‘Abkhazo-cherkesskie otnosheniya’ [Abkhaz-Circassian relations], Interview, 10th December 2010.
[8] Anti-Russian feeling developed in a number of Caucasian organisations abroad, including some Circassian ones, as a result of the events in Chechnya. These organisations originally provided aid to thousands of Chechen refugees, who fled to Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, but also appealed to international organisations denouncing the harsh methods used to conduct the war in Chechnya. Such organisations have subsequently attracted the special attention of Georgian intelligence, which are attempting to use them as a resource in their anti-Russia policy and to resolve problems with Abkhazia.
[9] The ethnonyms used by the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus themselves do not always coincide with the ethnonyms used by others (exonyms). Thus, the ethnonym “Circassian” in literary sources could often refer not only to a member of the Adyghe people, but also the Ubykh and the Abkhaz and occasionally even a member of other mountain peoples. However, the ethnonym “Circassian” in Russian (“cherkess”) comprises the Adyghe group of peoples – Kabardinians, Adygheyans/Natukhai, Bzhedugs, Shapsugs, etc. This is the definition that is also commonly used in Abkhazia, and so the expression “Circassian history” is understood by the Abkhaz to be the history of the Adyghe and “the Circassian state” as the Adyghe state. In other words, the Abkhaz do not perceive themselves as Circassians at any level of identity. This term in Abkhaz consciousness constitutes a general exonym for the Adyghe peoples. In Adyghe sources, the situation is different again.
[10] Andzor Kabard (2011). ‘Cherkesskaya khronika – optimicheskaya tragediya’ [A Circassian chronicle – an optimistic tragedy], Adyge Kheku. Available (in Russian) at http://bit.ly/IrhDye  
[11] Ruslan Keshev (2010). ‘Abkhazo-cherkesskie otnosheniya: “bratstvo navek” ili “razvod c kommunal’noy kvartire”?’ [Abkhaz-Circassian relations: ‘eternal brotherhood’ or ‘cohabiting divorcees’?].

This article was written in the framework of International Alert’s ‘Dialogue through Research’ project on the theme of the ‘The North-Caucasus Factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Dynamic’

Monday 21 May 2012

Черкесский вопрос и Абхазия – исторические моменты и современные вызовы. Моменты истории



Отрывок из статьи Арды Инал-Ипа для сборника "Некоторые аспекты взаимоотношений между Северным Кавказом и Абхазией", изданного  при поддержке International Alert.


В зависимости от складывающейся ситуации на Северном Кавказе в общественном дискурсе более или менее остро ставятся вопросы исторического прошлого, в частности, истории взаимоотношений кавказских народов с Россией. Несмотря на полтора века, прошедших после окончания Кавказской войны, продолжающееся негативное влияние событий тех лет на современную ситуацию достаточно очевидно. Более того, существует мнение, что современный черкесский вопрос является продолжением Кавказской войны. При этом известно, что не каждая война имеет такие долгосрочные последствия. Постараемся понять, какие особенности российской борьбы за Кавказ заставляют вновь и вновь возвращаться к этому драматическому периоду истории.
  Сам характер ведения войны царской Россией создал прецедент, когда трудно отнестись к итогам войны, как к естественным результатам военного противостояния. Приведем описание одного из ее участников, генерал-лейтенанта Фадеева Р.А. : «…нам нужно было обратить восточный берег Черного моря в русскую землю и для того очистить от горцев все прибрежье... Надобно было истребить значительную часть… населения, чтобы заставить другую часть безусловно сложить оружие... Изгнание горцев и заселение западного Кавказа русскими – таков был план войны".[1]А вот свидетельство еще одного участника событий – военного географа М.Венюкова: «…война шла с неумолимою, беспощадной суровостью. Мы продвигались вперед шаг за шагом, но бесповоротно и очищая от горцев, до последнего человека, всякую землю, на которую раз становилась нога солдата. Горские аулы были выжигаемы целыми сотнями… посевы вытравлялись конями или даже вытаптывались. Население аулов…немедленно было уводимо под конвоем… и отправляемо к берегам Черного моря и далее, в Турцию»[2]. Характер военных действий, которые Россия вела против народов Западного Кавказа, осуждался многими современниками, сегодня же потомками побежденных народов они воспринимаются как воплощение геноцида.
1.      Другой фактор, объясняющий непреходящую актуальность для народов Западного Кавказа событий XIX в. – это то, что на пике сопротивления царской имперской политике была озвучена идея создания Черкесского государства. Этому способствовала позиция ряда европейских стран, в особенности Великобритании, соперничавших с Россией на Кавказе и во всем черноморском регионе. Вопросы государственности на другом уровне возникали в 1917, 1918, 1920, 1921 годах и позже – уже в составе российской Федерации (кстати сказать, в большинство этих проектов была включена и Абхазия). Однако проекты государства или союзной республики, объединявшей весь адыгский народ, не оказались долговечными[3].    
2.      Третий важный, на наш взгляд, фактор связан с тем, что многие современные российские ученые и общественные деятели не дали объективной оценки Кавказской войне. Сегодня некоторые российские историки и публичные деятели, в отличие от своих предшественников в XIX веке, оправдывают, или, по крайней мере, замалчивают крайне жестокие способы ведения войны на Западном Кавказе. Отрицание преступлений, совершенных царской Россией во времена Кавказской войны, фактически не дает возможности перевернуть трагическую страницу истории и оставляет эту конфликтогенную тему в современном общественном дискурсе, что негативным образом отражается на отношениях адыгов к российскому центру.
3.      Самым тяжелым наследием тех времен стала сформировавшаяся парадигма решения проблем на Северном Кавказе, построенная не на поиске компромисса или общих интересов, а на необходимости уничтожения или изгнания противника. К сожалению, иногда создается впечатление, что остаточные элементы этого подхода остаются актуальными и сегодня, продолжая оказывать свое негативное влияние на ситуацию.


[1]  Фадеев Р.А."Кавказская война", Москва, 2003 г.
[2]  М.И. Венюков. "Кавказские воспоминания (1861-63)". "Русский архив". 1880. 1_4.
[3] Так, в ноябре 1917 года Союзом объединенных горцев Северного Кавказа и Дагестана было провозглашено государство Горская республика, однако, вскоре  правительство Горской республики объявило о самороспуске (после взятия Дагестана войсками генерала Деникина). Затем уже в составе РСФСР в 1918 г. была провозглашена Се́веро-Кавка́зская Сове́тская Респу́блика, объединившая 7 штатов: Дагестан, Чечено-Ингушетию, Осетию, Карачаево-Балкарию, Кабарду, Адыгею и Абхазию. Просуществовала Республика всего полгода. В 1920 г. была учреждена Горская автономная республика,  простиравшаяся лишь от Кабарды  до Чечни, которая также оказалась нежизнеспособной: в 1924 г. она была ликвидирована.