PRAGUE, 21 January, Caucasus Times.Mauricia Jenkins:Independent consultant, worked from 2001 to
2003 as political officer for the United Nations Observer Mission In Georgia.
During the previous three years made regular visits to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia .She designed and implemented several projects on community and peace
building in Abkhazia and Gal/i region
and facilitated cross-border relations
between Georgian IDPs, returnees and Abkhaz NGOs. Among her activities, she
previously served in the Lord Chancellor Office as Justice of the Peace in the
Commission Area of Inner London (1990-1994), broadcasted on Current Affairs for
the Italian Service of the BBC and worked in the Press and Culture Section of
British Embassy in the former GDR (1976-79). In recent years she participated
to several OSCE election observation missions in different countries, monitoring
in particular women’s participation to the political process.
1. S.M.You have
rich practical experience in the Caucasus region working as a Political officer
of the UN Mission in Georgia. Now this Mission has stopped its activity. How
can you estimate its effectiveness? What the most important pluses and minuses
of it can you name?
M.D. The work carried out by the Mission over its 16 years in
Georgia has been subject to legitimate scrutiny, but also to criticism, not
always well informed or deserved. My observations relate mainly to the
five-year period of direct experience of the mission’s operations, which began
in mid 1998.
To have a clear picture, one needs to distinguish the monitoring
activities of the military observers, who were addressing security matters,
stipulated in detail by the May 1994 Ceasefire and Separation of Forces
Agreement, from the more wide-ranging work of the political office, which was
striving to reach a comprehensive political settlement. This involved, primarily,
the question of the status of Abkhazia and of citizenship, the agreement on
security guarantees, the rehabilitation of the economy and of the
infrastructure, and, of course, the safe and dignified return of the Internally
Displaced People (IDPs).
On the military side, one must remember that United Nations Observer
Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was an observer mission and that the duties of the
military monitors were to observe and report through the appropriate channels,
not to respond to problems, as sometimes outsiders expected them to do. They were
unarmed and for their safety relied on the protection of the CIS peacekeepers,
with whom they conducted joint patrols. The Area of Responsibility (AoR) on the
Abkhaz side of the border covered the highly volatile territories of Kodori
Valley and Gal/i region. Land mines, criminal gangs and ‘partisan groups’ controlled
from the Georgian side, made operations difficult. Winning the trust of the
returnees and establishing essential lines of contact with them was also a
challenge, as they lived in constant fear and in atrocious conditions.
Taking all this into account, I think that the military branch
discharged their duty in a competent manner and made a significant contribution
to keeping the everyday security situation under control, sometimes at
considerable personal risk. The shooting down of the UN helicopter in Upper
Kodori in October 2001 is an unequivocal reminder.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can also say that UNOMIG role
was important for setting in place a framework of confidence building measures
aimed at promoting dialogue between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides. In 1997 the
first session of the UN- led talks of the Geneva Process began. In the same
year the parties agreed on the establishment of the Georgian- Abkhaz
Coordinating Council, which was to operate via three working groups (WG): on
security and non-resumption of hostilities
(WGI); refugees and IDPs issues (WGII); and socio-economic problems
(WGIII). Three big conferences in Athens, Istanbul and Yalta took place in
1998, 1999 and in 2001, bringing together a variety of officials and representatives
of Georgian and Abkhaz society. At the same time, between 1998 and 2001, UNOMIG
began actively to encourage and foster contacts of Abkhaz and Georgian NGOs,
journalists and experts across the conflict divide. A number of meetings were
held in Tbilisi and Gal/i , while new ideas and cross-border projects began to
take shape. Moreover, International NGOs, UN agencies and relief organizations
received valuable logistic and organizational support to gain access and travel
in the conflict zone. The sanctions imposed by the Georgians in 1996 and the
consequent intransigence of the Abkhaz authorities made progress difficult and
slow. Nevertheless, at non- governmental level, several ongoing peace- building
dialogues did start with the facilitation of UNOMIG at that time.
On the political front, the Mission did not succeed in bringing
about a political settlement. More specifically, it failed in putting forward a
proposal concerning Abkhaz status, acceptable to the Georgian and Abkhaz sides,
which in turn would have allowed the vital issues of security guarantees,
return of the IDPs and economic rehabilitation to be negotiated in a more constructive
manner. In my view, one important reason for this was that in such negotiations
the UN was neither neutral, nor did it appear to be so. Indeed nor could it have been, given the geopolitical
interests of some key UN member states, active also in the very influential
Group of Friends of the Secretary General, with whom the political solution had
to be discussed. Consequently, the paper on The Distribution of Competences
between Tbilisi and Sukhum/i, finalized by the Special Representative of the Secretary
General, Dieter Boden, in December 2001, which envisaged from the outset dual
sovereignty of Georgia and Abkhazia on Georgian territory, safeguarding the
principle of territorial integrity, was rejected by the Sukhum/i authorities.
2
S.M Now many experts write about the lack of international
presence both in Abkhazia and South Ossetia? What dangers can it bring for the
conflict resolution dynamics? Can you see any opportunities to change this
situation? How will Russia and the West reach a compromise on this issue? And
what kind of international mediation could be considered as the best option?
M.D. Let’s concentrate on Abkhazia and be pragmatic in tackling
this question.
International involvement in conflict resolution is potentially a
valuable asset, but can also be counterproductive and carries risks.
The Western approach to the solution of the Georgian-Abkhaz
conflict, for instance, had as a prime goal the containment of Russia. All
policies aimed at finding a solution, leaving more or less convincing rhetoric
aside, were conceived in the light of geopolitical interests. The settlement
itself, to some extent, was secondary. Over the years, we have witnessed
Western governments supporting the failing policy of sanctions, brushing under
the carpet the principle of self- determination and neglecting an active and
visible policy of engagement in the conflict zone, hence contributing to the
polarization of positions of the two parties. Russia, on the other hand, responded
beginning to increase its influence in the conflict region, well before 2008, with
a series of measures (issuing of Russian passports, rehabilitation of the
railways, easing of border restrictions, etc) which proved very valuable to the
Abkhaz population and to Russian-Abkhaz relations, but detrimental to the Georgian-Abkhaz
peace process.
One has to consider and qualify carefully, therefore, which type
of international intervention is desirable, its real aims and who is benefiting
from it. The EU policy of Engagement without Recognition, launched in December
2009, in my view, has a flaw, because it brings to the fore the highly political
and contentious principle of non- recognition, which we know as unacceptable to
the Abkhaz. A EU policy of engagement and reconciliation in Abkhazia is vital,
but it should be ‘without preconditions’, depoliticized and with tangible
benefits for the population at large. Moreover, however well meaning, it cannot be a
substitute for direct dialogue between the two sides, who need to find new terms
of reference for a road map on different issues, just as the Russian and
Georgian governments are now doing in their bilateral meetings .The case of the
Inguri hydroelectric power station shows that partnerships can be forged and
maintained across the conflict divide.
Coming to the question regarding the kind of international
mediation in which Russia and the West could work together, for the time being
I believe that the Geneva International Discussions are the answer. They are
moving slowly, but are the only arena, where all actors involved in the South
Ossetian-Georgian and Abkhaz-Georgian wars can meet.
If the Geneva Talks were to deliver a Treaty of Non Resumption of
Hostilities, there is no doubt that their credibility would receive a considerable
boost.
3
S.M In one of your comments on Abkhazia you stated that “successful negotiations for the return of the IDPs to Abkhazia and a
sound peace agreement between the Abkhaz and Georgian sides can be achieved
only if both the West and the Georgian government change their approaches”.
What approaches do you mean? And how will they reach those changes?
M.D. Ethnic conflicts are intractable and difficult to resolve,
particularly after a protracted and violent dispute. Furthermore, they are
emotionally highly charged, as they threaten deep-rooted feelings of cultural
identity and ethnic survival. It is essential, therefore, that the fundamental
principals guiding a negotiating process are clear from the offset. The enabling
tools (international engagement,
channels of mediations, etc) are secondary.
To me, a genuine wish for
reconciliation by both sides, together with the recognition that both have equal
political and moral rights, are essential. Without such components any lasting agreement
will remain unobtainable. Turning to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and to the
policies so far adopted by the Georgian side with the support of its Western
partners, frankly I do not see any such a commitment. The response from the
Sukhum/i authorities is bound to be unconstructive.
To begin with, the blockade imposed in January 1996 was aimed at forcing
the surrender of an opponent through isolation and deprivation. Reconciliation
was not on the agenda. The sanctions set in place caused untold hardship and
suffering to the population. When I began visiting Abkhazia, in mid 1998,
I witnessed at first hand the dreadful
conditions that both the Abkhaz people and Georgian returnees had to endure.
The latter were considered ‘traitors’ by many Georgians, because they had
returned to their birth place in Gali, while the daily struggle for survival
and self -preservation, made the resentment and the desire of the Abkhaz for
independence grow stronger by the day. Against such a backdrop it proved
impossible to reach a positive conclusion to the talks on a safe and dignified return
of the IDPs to Abkhazia . What I found interesting at that time was that anti-Russian
feelings were also present among the Abkhaz population, because the CIS troops manning
the borders were mostly Russian. However, in this respect a shift of attitudes
slowly begun to take place, as I mentioned earlier, when Putin came to power. Even
if some confidence building initiatives and rehabilitation programmes had begun
in the late nineties with the help of UN agencies and a few Western countries, their
impact was limited, as Georgian sanctions were kept in place. In the Saakashvili era, with the mounting support
given by the western community to Georgia, in terms of aid and assistance on
various fronts, the gap between the two sides widened still further. The war
with South Ossetia was the coup de grace. Looking at Georgian-Abkhaz relations
today, I think that the Georgian side has to come to terms with the fact that
sanctions failed and that an entirely new spirit has to be at the heart of
their strategies .The notion that Russia is the main cause of the present state
of affairs, is simply not true. To begin with the gradual abolition of sanctions
and the departure from “territorial integrity ”as a guiding principle, should
be reconsidered.
Turning to Georgia’s allies, the West in general, and in
particular the Bush administration, must share responsibility for the Georgian failure
in the peace process, as they did not recognize the need of their engagement in
Abkhazia and gave almost unconditional backing to the Saakashvili regime, which
excelled at
“spin” but had a very poor
record on upholding democratic rights. With a new government now in place in Georgia,
Western countries have the opportunity to revisit their approach and learn from
past mistakes. The EU in particular should be at the forefront and agree with
Georgia on a new strategy, aimed at bringing barriers down and at the
de-isolation of Abkhazia, in terms of transfer of know-how, socio-economic
rehabilitation, institution-building, good governance, cross-border exchanges
and freedom of movement.
4
S.M In 2008
Russia recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. How can you
evaluate the development of both republics for the period of consequent five
years? What challenges have they brought?
M.D. I have not been to South Ossetia for a long time, therefore I
will direct my observations only to Abkhazia.
The recognition by Russia was a turning point in several ways.
Firstly, it made the Abkhaz feel ‘accepted’ and less vulnerable. Russian forces
and financial support from Moscow also brought border security and the
possibility to begin an essential socio-economic rehabilitation of the
infrastructure. A multitude of bilateral treaties with Russia (more than
seventy so far), are establishing increasing ties and cooperation between the
two allies in a variety of fields, including institution building. Tourism and
private business initiatives have transformed Sukhum/i and holiday resorts
along the coast. If I look back at my early visits to Abkhazia in 1998, when
streets were almost empty, signs of activity were absent, and many buildings were
uninhabitable, this is an entirely different world. The picture changes
considerably, however, if one moves inland. In the regions, unemployment and
poor infrastructure are highly problematic. Living standards are much higher
for some, but have remained almost unchanged for others. At institutional
level, parliament is weak vis-à-vis a too strong central government, while the
justice system is fragile. What is most striking in all this is the almost
total absence of the West, in terms of any meaningful assistance, on the one
hand, and the omnipresence of Russia, on the other. The need to re-dress the
balance should be obvious to all interested parties, including Russia, if the internal
stability of Abkhazia and democratic development are a priority.
On the vital question of state building, Natela Akaba has written
a thought provoking paper, ‘ “ The Abkhazia” project: political nation or
community of minorities? ’. Personally, I think that Abkhazia is at a cross-
road. Government, parliament and the public at large have to decide, if the
ethno-centric state infrastructure now in place should become gradually more
open to mirror its multi-ethnic society, or if the Abkhaz-centric profile is to
be kept in place. In other words, they need to reflect, whether democratic
inclusiveness is going to be the guiding principle of their state -building
project. Moreover, they must face the thorny question of whether, in the longer
term, the present isolation of the Georgian inhabitants of Gal/i, is in the
interest of national security and stability, or if their gradual integration into
wider society will make Abkhazia stronger, more secure and self-reliant.
5
S.M You
observe the political dynamics in Georgia. The period of president Saakashvili
is over. What impact will it have on the dynamics around the two
ethno-political conflicts?
M.D. The heritage of Saakhashvili is a heavy baggage to bear for
the new Georgian government in various ways.
To begin with, the nationalistic rhetoric is bound to remain for
sometime in the mind of the Georgian people and a change of approach and policy
on the resolutions of the two conflicts, if chosen, will require a lot of
explaining at home. To gain the support of its citizens and of the IDPs in
particular, the new government will have to speak with one voice and find
convincing arguments to lead the country on a different course.
This will not be easy, because the Georgian Dream coalition
consists of several parties with diverse views and because, as mentioned
earlier, on ethno-political conflicts emotions can run very high.
The re-establishment of good relations with Russia will be a key
factor. A good deal of diplomatic efforts will have to be invested in this, but
already there are signs that the new government has taken on board the fact that
getting closer to Europe and building better relations with Russia are both
essential for the stability of Georgia’s future.
The war with South Ossetia represents, no doubt, the most
difficult inheritance of the Saakashvili era. To distance itself from the past
and build some form of trust with the South Ossetians and the Abkhaz people,
the Georgian government will have to be prepared to adopt convincing U-turn
policies and offer tangible proofs of its intention. To continue with the same
old approach will bring no reward.
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