Commentary on the Resolution of the European Parliament for Georgia, 17 November 2011

SPECIALLY FOR ALLS by Iraklii Khintba

On 17 November 2011, the European Parliament by a majority vote adopted a resolution on Georgia, which the government of Saakashvili has already christened "historic". The resolution’s text comprises exceptionally strong language, unusual in the rhetoric of European representatives: “to recognise the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as occupied territories”, “to call upon Russia to withdraw the recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and stop the occupation”, “to welcome Georgia’s Strategy on [the] Occupied Territories and Action Plan as an effective instrument to promote reconciliation”, etc...

This resolution, from a purely formal viewpoint, may be deemed a definite achievement for Georgian  diplomacy. However, in essence it is another example of the advancing of a fallacious and ineffective strategy regarding the post-August reality vis-à-vis the South Caucasus. To ignore the existence of the ethno-political Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and the problems surrounding the ethnic compatibility between Georgians and Abkhazians after the bloody war of 1992-93, concealing all this under the guise of confrontation between Georgia and Russia and a purely mythical occupation, is utterly useless from the point of view of the actual situation on the ground in the region and the still unresolved conflicts.

It should be underlined that this resolution has a recommendatory character, and yet it is hardly able to achieve any cardinal changes in the region. Furthermore, it is unlikely that it will have any influence whatsoever on the official rhetoric of those European officials who participate directly in what is going on with regard to the unsolved Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. And there is absolutely no doubt that even such toughly worded formulations will not make Russia abandon its own national interests and obligations.

Another matter is that the adopted resolution strikes yet another blow on the negative image of Europe and the West as a whole that has already formed in the consciousness of the people of Abkhazia. The majority, who do not scrutinise the refinements and nuances of European politics with regard to the Southern Caucasus, are more and more disposed against Western influence in their country. As a result, the legitimacy of any possible joint-action in the sphere of culture, education and democratic development might be lost. Who will be the winner here? I do not think that it will be Europe.

If one speaks of specifics, the peremptory nature of the formulations contained in the resolution is surprising. And the resolution itself looks extremely partial and unjust. Attention can be drawn to the fact that in the preamble there is no reference to any document or evidence that takes into account the position of the authorities of Abkhazia, whereas there is mention of Mikheil Saakashvili’s speech in the European Parliament is indicated. It is clear that no groundwork had been done for the collection of facts, just as the position of the Abkhazian side was not listened to and its opinion was simply ignored.

Conclusions are drawn in the resolution regarding the “occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia” without any definition of clear criteria for “occupation” or the application of appropriate argumentation and facts. Not one of those who voted for the resolution bothered to find the time to visit Abkhazia and see everything with their own eyes. For example, where did information about “ethnic cleansings” come from? Nothing of the kind has appeared in any document, even the most critical, regarding Abkhazia since 2008. Why has it become possible to adopt such an unprecedentedly biased document?

In our opinion, quite apart from other reasons, there is a prosaic political logic at work here: after the “bitter pill” it is necessary to offer a “sweet bon-bon”. Georgia had to abandon its basic negotiating position on Russia's WTO accession under pressure from the West. Having withdrawn its demand for Georgian custom officials to be present at the Russian-Abkhazian border on the River Psou, Tbilisi, one can say, has recognised these borders as not its own. A private audit at the border will quickly in time become a mere formality, and, after three years can be done away with altogether. Moreover, in Georgia irritation has long been brewing over the unwillingness of European officials to identify for Tbilisi at least some prospects of EU membership. We recall how the bitterness of another failure in fixing the time-frame for membership of NATO was similarly sweetened for Tbilisi by means of the odious Resolution of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, adopted a few days before the Lisbon Summit.

In general, the said resolution once again marks out a problem that prevents the effective participation of the EU in resolving the conflicts and promoting development in the Southern Caucasus. In particular, it undermines the efforts of the EU Southern Caucasus office regarding cooperation with Abkhazia. If the Abkhazian authorities are just puppets who decide nothing, as follows from the resolution, then why do European officials visit Sukhum and meet with Abkhazian officials? However, just recently, the new EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus, F. Lefort, visited Sukhum and noted the importance of contacts with the authorities of the republic.

Consequently, the main problem is the total lack of coordination in Europe’s involvement in the region. Firstly, there is lack of agreement at the level of EU policy-formulation, comprising rivalry between the branches of European power, and within certain structures (opposition between K. Ashton and P. Semneby). Secondly, there is a dramatic gap in the real understanding of the situation existing between a small number of EU officials and the expert-groups supporting them, on the one hand, and the bulk of not only European officials and MEPs, but Europeans in general, on the other hand. The crises that are shaking the European Union at the present time have an impact on this situation.

As a result, we have a resolution that has little impact on the rhetoric and political tactics of Europeans who interact directly with Abkhazia, and which, naturally, will have no bearing on Russian politics but will clearly worsen the overall perception of the West in the eyes of the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. If the adoption of such a one-sided resolution is also able to encourage the morale of the Georgian leadership, then it is doubtful that it can play a positive role in strengthening stability in the Southern Caucasus.

- Русская версия: Комментарий на Резолюцию Европарламента по Грузии от 17 ноября 2011 г.

Комментарий на Резолюцию Европарламента по Грузии от 17 ноября 2011 г.

Специально для ALLS от кандидата политических наук Ираклия Хинтба, Абхазский государственный университет и Центр гуманитарных программ.

17 ноября 2011 г. Европейский парламент подавляющим большинством голосов принял резолюцию по Грузии, которую правительство Саакашвили уже успело окрестить «исторической». Текст резолюции содержит крайне жесткие формулировки, обычно не свойственные риторике европейских представителей: «признать грузинские регионы Абхазию и Южную Осетию оккупированными территориями», «призвать Россию отозвать признание отделившихся грузинских регионов Абхазии и Южной Осетии и прекратить их оккупацию», «приветствовать Грузинскую стратегию по оккупированным территориям и План действий как эффективный инструмент примирения», «этнические чистки, имевшие место в оккупированных территориях» и так далее.

Эту резолюцию формально можно считать определенным достижением грузинской дипломатии. Однако по сути - это очередной пример продвижения ошибочной и неэффективной стратегии в отношении поставгустовских реалий на Южном Кавказе. Игнорировать существование этнополитического грузино-абхазского конфликта и проблемы этнической совместимости грузин и абхазов после кровопролитной войны 1992-1993 гг., маскируя все это противостоянием Грузии и России и мифической оккупацией, совершенно бесполезно с точки зрения сложившейся ситуации в регионе и неразрешенных конфликтов.

Следует подчеркнуть, что данная резолюция носит рекомендательный характер и, на самом деле, вряд ли способна привести к кардинальным изменениям в регионе. Кроме того, маловероятно, что она повлияет на официальную риторику тех еврочиновников, которые непосредственным образом участвуют в ситуации неразрешенного грузино-абхазского конфликта. Несомненно, что даже такие жесткие и определенные формулировки не заставят Россию поступиться своими национальными интересами и обязательствами.

Другое дело, что принятая резолюция наносит еще один удар по и без того негативному образу Европы и Запада в целом, формируемому в сознании жителей Абхазии. Большинство, которое не вникает в тонкости и нюансы европейской политики на Южном Кавказе, все больше настраивается против западного влияния в своей стране. В итоге, могут окончательно потерять легитимность возможности для взаимодействия в области культуры, образования, демократического развития. Кто от этого выигрывает больше? Не думаю, что сама Европа.

Если говорить по сути, то удивляет безаппеляционность формулировок, содержащихся в резолюции. Сама резолюция выглядит крайне пристрастной и несправедливой. Можно обратить внимание на то, что в преамбуле нет ссылки ни на один документ или иное свидетельство учета позиций властей Абхазии, зато есть указание на речь Михаила Саакашвили в Европарламенте. Очевидно, что не было проведено вообще никакой полевой работы по сбору фактов, равно как не была выслушана позиция абхазской стороны, которая попросту игнорируется.

В резолюции делаются выводы по «оккупации Абхазии и Южной Осетии» без определения четких критериев «оккупации», приведения соответствующей аргументации и фактологии. Никто из голосовавших за резолюцию не удосужился побывать в Абхазии и увидеть все своими глазами. К примеру, откуда взялась информация об «этнических чистках»? Ни в одном документе, даже наиболее критического свойства, не содержится ничего подобного в отношении Абхазии после 2008 г. Почему вообще стало возможным принятие такого беспрецедентно ангажированного документа?

На наш взгляд, здесь, помимо иных причин, действует прозаическая политическая логика: после «горькой пилюли» необходимо предложить «сладкую конфету». Грузии пришлось отказаться от своих основных переговорных позиций по вопросу вступления России в ВТО именно под нажимом Запада. Сняв требование о присутствии грузинских таможенников на российско-абхазской границе по р. Псоу, Тбилиси, можно сказать, признал эти границы не своими. Частный аудит на границе со временем, скорее всего, превратится в пустую формальность, а через три года и вовсе может быть свернут. Кроме того, в Грузии давно зреет раздражение нежеланием еврочиновников наметить для Тбилиси хотя бы какие-то перспективы членства в ЕС. Напомним, как горечь очередного отказа в фиксированных сроках членства в НАТО была аналогичным образом подслащена для Тбилиси одиозной резолюцией Парламентской Ассамблеи НАТО, принятой за несколько дней до начала Лиссабонского Саммита альянса.

В целом, данная резолюция в очередной раз обозначает проблему, препятствующую эффективному участию ЕС в урегулировании конфликтов и содействию развитию на Южном Кавказе. В частности, она подрывает усилия Южнокавказского офиса ЕС по взаимодействию с Абхазией. Если абхазские власти - это лишь ничего не решающие марионетки, как следует из резолюции, то зачем тогда еврочиновникам приезжать в Сухум и встречаться с абхазскими официальными лицами? Однако буквально на днях Сухум посетил новый спецпредставитель ЕС по Южному Кавказу Ф. Лефор, который отметил важность контактов с властями республики.

Таким образом, основная проблема состоит в общей несогласованности европейского участия в делах региона. Во-первых, существует несогласованность на уровне выработки политики ЕС, заключающаяся в конкуренции как между ветвями европейской власти, так и внутри определенных структур (противостояние К. Эштон и П. Семнеби). Во-вторых, имеет место драматический разрыв в реальном понимании ситуации между небольшим кругом официальных лиц ЕС и поддерживающих их экспертных групп и основной массой не только еврочиновников и евродепутатов, но и европейцев в целом. Кризисы, которые сотрясают Евросоюз в настоящее время, также влияют на это положение.

В итоге, мы имеем резолюцию, которая мало повлияет на риторику и политическую тактику европейцев, непосредственно взаимодействующих с Абхазией, и, естественно, не будет иметь никакого отношения к российской политике, но явно ухудшит общее восприятие Запада в глазах жителей Абхазии и Южной Осетии. Если принятие столь односторонней резолюции и способно поддержать моральный дух грузинского руководства, то сыграть позитивную роль в деле укрепления стабильности на Южном Кавказе она вряд ли сможет.

Political propaganda under a veil of “scientific objectivity”

Commentary of  a Professor in Political Sciences Iraklii Khintba,  Abkhaz State University and  Centre for Humanitarian Programs  on the Resolution 1832 (2011) of CE Parliamentary Assembly adopted on 4 October, 2011

Resolution 1832 (2011) of the CE Parliamentary Assembly  «National sovereignty and statehood in contemporary international law: the need for clarification» produces a rather ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it resembles a synopsis of a lecture on international law and practice by virtue of the style and argumentation employed. On the other hand, one can easily detect elements of political propaganda masquerading under a veil of «scientific objectivity».

The Resolution, which in fact is just a recommendation, begins with the acknowledgment that there is «the lack of clear criteria for statehood and for lawful secession» and «the criteria for statehood remain a contentious issue in contemporary international law». The reader expects that further on the document will provide such criteria and clarifications. But unfortunately what follows is just a dogmatic argument on non-acceptance of secession as a form of national self-determination.

So the first question arises: why do they call for elaborating clear criteria and clarification of the issue, if their purpose is just reiterating old but still ambiguous and disputable arguments?

In the concluding part of the document, the PA «invites all member states to refrain from recognizing or supporting in any way the de facto authorities of territories resulting from unlawful secessions». If there is still no certainty on the issue of lawful secessions, how to determine that, for instance, the Abkhazian secession was unlawful? And why does the resolution call for non-recognition in the absence of the criteria for statehood? It proposes that «the criteria for statehood, including those for the emergence of new states by legal secession and the modalities of protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states be examined thoroughly in the framework of a follow-up conference to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty». Great, but it has not yet been done. If they acknowledge the existence of a certain «legal gap», why not continue to refrain from politically propagandistic statements on the illegality of secessions and movements for self-determination in the region?

The second question concerns the mechanisms or the machinery for resolving conflicts and other disputes stemming from aspirations of different identities in Europe. Why do the authors of the Resolution deliberately confuse the notions of cultural and political conflicts and ethno-political conflicts (ethno-territorial)?

The Resolution refers to the earlier document (Resolution 1334 (2003)), which was to clarify and legitimize the only way to resolve identity conflicts, i.e. autonomization and decentralization. And here again we encounter this substitution of notions. The conflicts they consider are political and primarily non-violent ones, caused by unjust distribution of power and economic gains. Groups that struggle for improving their structural conditions need to be distinguished from groups which have undergone violent wars and claim independence. Decentralization is appropriate for correcting structural inequities and empowering groups. But as an instrument to address strong ethnic and political conflicts it is hardly relevant .

This reluctance to acknowledge the different nature of conflicts in the region contributes to the low efficiency of European engagement in conflict-resolution and transformation-processes in the South Caucasus. For instance, the authors of the Resolution prefer to forget that the reason for the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is not what they call «Russian intervention» in 2008. The real reasons are Soviet quasi-federalism, which spurred ethno-nationalism, and the aggression of the illegitimate Georgian government against its own citizens and their state in 1992 (under the Soviet Constitution autonomous republics [such as Abkhazia] enjoyed the status of a state).

The only point that inspires confidence is the final provision of the Resolution «to analyze the origin and trends of self-determination movements by addressing the most salient factors, in particular instances of growing tensions among minority or ethnic groups». Europe does indeed need a far better understanding of the conflicts in the South Caucasus. Maybe this process will help the truth to come out, so that the conflicts are more properly addressed.

Virtual Motion of the UN General Assembly

The resolution on the Status of the refugees (the so-called internally displaced persons) from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinval(i) Region/South Ossetia, Georgia (document A/65/L.74) was adopted by a recorded vote of 57 in favour to 13 against, with 74 abstentions.

In favour: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, Vanuatu.

This motion can only be put down to the witchcraft-like influence of the Georgian lobby.

A more sober viewer would raise several questions. Consider the “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of the UN Commission on Human Rights (11 February 1998)”, and, in particular, the following:

Principle 6

“2. The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement:

b. In situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;”

The countries that voted In Favour are perhaps not aware of the armed conflict or of the fact that Georgia has totally failed to establish any relationship with Abkhazia. On the contrary, Georgia has been continuously launching terrorist activity, forcing the refugees to form the “White Legion” and “Forest Brothers” terrorist groups to operate in Abkhazia’s border-region of Gal.

Principle 7

2. The authorities undertaking such displacement shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to the displaced persons, that such displacements are effected in satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene, and that members of the same family are not separated.

The countries that voted In Favour are probably not aware of the fact that, when the Georgian army invaded Abkhazia, it ransacked and destroyed Abkhazians houses and apartments. Did any representative of the of these 57 countries voting In favour bother to try to learn the conditions of ‘safety, nutrition, health and hygiene’ of the inhabitants of Abkhazia who suffered post-war water- and electricity-problems, accommodation-problems and post-war blockade for years until it was lifted following recognition by Russia.

Have these countries ever thought about the question of accommodation for the refugees before they voted In Favour? Where do they suppose returning Kartvelians would find work in Abkhazia when faced with such facts as:

1. Abkhazians do not speak Georgian, and conversely Kartvelians do not speak Abkhazian. Have these voters scheduled any language- or house-building programmes?

2. post-war Abkhazia is doing utmost but struggling to find employment for its own indigenous people in Abkhazia, a country intentionally and totally isolated from the world through sanctions imposed on it for being a victim of Georgian aggression.

Principle 10

1. Every human being has the inherent right to life which shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. Internally displaced persons shall be protected in particular against:

a. Genocide;

b. Murder;

c. Summary or arbitrary executions; and

d. Enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, threatening or resulting in death.

Threats and incitement to commit any of the foregoing acts shall be prohibited.

The countries that voted In Favour perhaps do not know that on 14 August 1992 the Georgian invasion into Abkhazia began with persecution of Abkhazians, murder, arbitrary executions, and enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowledged detention, threatening (or actually resulting in) death. During the war two clear threats of genocide were issued, one by a Georgian military leader (on video) and the other by a leading member of the aggressor administration (published in Le Monde Diplomatique), which means that, contrary to their usual condemnation of threats/commission of genocide, the countries voting In Favour openly ally themselves with a state that is guilty of the same.

Principle 29

1. Internally displaced persons who have returned to their homes or places of habitual residence or who have resettled in another part of the country shall not be discriminated against as a result of their having been displaced. They shall have the right to participate fully and equally in public affairs at all levels and have equal access to public services.

The countries that voted In Favour are perhaps not aware of the fact that the refugees from Abkhazia are now actually residing on their indigenous lands, which they were forced to leave during (Georgian!) Stalin’s Black Terror (1937-1953) and in the land where the Georgian language is considered the state-language, though Mingrelian has no official status. It seems doubtful that these people would prefer to live in a different cultural atmosphere. Abkhazians treat Georgia as an enemy state. Georgia constantly instigates and demonstrates its odium towards Abkhazians. Georgia has failed to establish friendly relations. It is easy to damage relations, but it is not that easy to win back confidence. It takes decades or even centuries (as once stated by Georgia’s president Mikheil Saakashvili) in an area like the Caucasus, where the blood-feud has been a centuries-old tradition.

Regretfully, the adopted UN Resolution on Status of IDPs and Refugees from Abkhazia was not based on documents, including the UN’s very own Reports on Georgia, not to mention a mass of historical data. One of our concerns is that Georgia will seek to gain wider support for this Resolution as it continues its determined efforts to dupe the international community into believing that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are ‘occupied territories’ and to divert attention from the humanitarian problems from which people continue to suffer. In a word, Georgia misrepresents itself to the international community, and that international community has proved itself far too gullible to such deception for far too long.

No one denies the fact that refugees deserve sympathy and proper care, but those who started the war should have considered the consequences for their kin in Abkhazia before taking the decision to begin hostilities.

ALLS Media Monitoring Team

Sukhum, Abkhazia