[Regarding] the
former Minister of Defence of Georgia:
on the war and the situation concerning Abkhazia (1992-1993 years).
At one time, the poet Nikolaj Glazkov very aptly said of the twentieth
century:
I gaze at the world from under the table,
The twentieth century - the century of the extraordinary.
A century of interest to the historian for the same reason
That it is sorrowful for anyone living it!
So today one remembers the events of what is already in the past, the 20th
century, when on the space of the former Soviet Union there broke out wars,
conflicts, and clashes ... One of the bloodiest events of the century was the
war unleashed by Georgia against Abkhazia. The Tbilisi authorities have tried to blame the
leadership of our country for what happened. Shevardnadze from the start
began inventing various reasons, versions, causes for why the State Council’s
troops invaded Abkhazia, hinting that his Defence Minister, T. Kitovani, was
to blame for this. However, the testimones of many Georgian military and
political activists speak of the beginning of the war as the private
initiative principally of Shevardnadze. Sufficiently weighty grounds have
been adduced in the reminiscences of such generals as Z. Mamulashvili, G.
Lominadze and others, which have been repeatedly cited by Abkhazian
politicians and historians.
Well,
in 2006, it came to my knowledge that there had been published in Tbilisi as something
like a "samizdat"-publication with a miserly print-run a small
booklet entitled "Notes of a commando-commissar". The author was
one of the closest people to Shevardnadze, General Levan Sharashenidze, who
from January to May 1992 headed the Ministry of Defence of Georgia. During
this period, he repeatedly travelled to Sukhum and held negotiations with
Vladislav Ardzinba. The memoirs of General L. Sharashenidze can be described
as a precious source, since he places concentrates totally on this military
adventure and names the main culprit of the war unleashed in 1992. Here's
what he wrote about the events on the eve of the invasion:
"...
E. A. Shevardnadze during this period did not once meet V. G. Ardzinba,
although he had agreed to a meeting, even after his arrival in Tbilisi. I had several
meetings with Ardzinba, and I confirm this as well as the fact that the
Abkhazian leadership at that time endorsed the return of Eduard Shevardnadze
to Georgia
and held out some hopes in it. In any case, Shevardnadze himself could and
should have held negotiations with the Abkhazian leadership, [but] for some
reason he extemporised and made his meeting dependent on certain conditions. During
this period, May-June 1992, I met Ardzinba four times and certify the
accuracy of all of the above. After each meeting, I debriefed Shevardnadze in
great detail, including on the readiness of Ardzinba to meet him." [1]
Apparently, such a
minister-peacemaker was not what those times required, and he was replaced in
May 1992 by the criminal Tengiz Kitovani. It is obvious that Shevardnadze,
with his delusions of grandeur, had made his choice of scenario -- a military
solution to the Abkhazian problem. At the same time, he even so still feared
the reaction of Moscow,
as he wished, figuratively speaking, to enter into Abkhazia, without entering
the CIS. And Georgia’s
joining the CIS was the main condition for the return of Shevardnadze to Tbilisi, where he could
go back, with the military and political support of the Kremlin. As head of
the State Council of Georgia, Shevardnadze began to manoeuvre and drag out
the question of joining the CIS. His then-deputy, Dzh. Ioseliani, in response
to the obstinacy of his boss with regard to the CIS, prophetically remarked:
"If Moscow
sneezes, we get double pneumonia. What are you up to?" Shevardnadze
replied: "First it’s necessary to deal with Abkhazia". [2] It is
interesting to note that the opinion L. Sharashenidze on the invasion of
Abkhazia was essentially confirmed by the Georgian historian Z. Papaskiri. He
criticizes the actions of Eduard Shevardnadze in sending troops to Abkhazia,
where "the situation was extremely tense" and "the Georgian
government should have acted with maximum caution." Later Z. Papaskiri
writes:
"What do we have in mind? In our opinion, the Head of State should not
have been content with just telephone-conversations with Ardzinba. He should
himself have gone to Sukhum, met him in person and received from him ...
formal approval for the introduction of units of the Republic of Georgia
into Abkhazia. Unfortunately, however, none of this was done; clearly,
Shevardnadze’s political instincts let him down, and he did not take what
was, of course, by the standards of those times, such an extraordinary
step." [3]
His laconic assessment of the war-events is given by General L. Sharashenidze
thus: "The entry into Abkhazia began on 14 August,” he writes, “but E.
A. Shevardnadze, a politician and diplomat of such a high standing, who
arrived [sc. in Tbilisi] on 7 March, was unable, during more than five
months, to prevent the war. This unprepared, not properly provisioned entry
was, of course, undertaken with the consent of Eduard Shevardnadze, from
which he later distanced himself." [4]
All
these adventurous activities of Shevardnadze were a reflection of other,
deeper geopolitical processes, which General L. Sharashenidze mentions in
passing. The main issue for Georgia
in early 1992, continued to be the issue of joining the CIS. It was a sort of
a test for Shevardnadze. Of course, he promised Moscow
positively to solve the problem, and, on 7 March 1992, he arrived in Tbilisi. This was preceded
by important events.
In
January and February the Minister of Defence of Georgia, L. Sharashenidze,
twice met Shevardnadze in Moscow.
By this time in Russia and
Georgia
the choice had already been made in his favour. Thus, on 14 February 1992
there took place in Minsk
the second meeting between the heads of state and governments of the CIS
countries. The Georgian delegation was headed by L. Sharashenidze, who
overnight agreed the text of his speech by phone with Shevardnadze. "He
approved it and asked that after the summit I travel to Moscow to meet him," writes the
then-Minister of Defence. In his 3-minute speech in Minsk,
L. Sharashenidze, in part, declared:
"The question of Georgia's
entry into the CIS will be decided by parliament upon its election.
“I want to report that we are restoring good relations with the
Transcaucasian Military District troops on the territory of Georgia.
We have removed from them the status of a force of occupation. Naturally, we
reserve the right to participate in the discussion of all matters relating to
the Army and the Black Sea Fleet.
“We would request in the
future an invitation to meetings of the CIS for the relevant leaders of Georgia by
way of observers." [5]
It should be noted that the representatives of Georgia
wittingly or unwittingly misled the Russian leadership and talked about the
participation of leaders of Georgia
in the CIS only as observers. On his return from Minsk,
L. Sharashenidze met Shevardnadze in Moscow
and reported to him in detail on the summit of the CIS. Then another meeting
was scheduled where the question of his return to Georgia was to be decided. [6]
In February 1992, in
parallel with the summit of the CIS, there arrived in Sukhum a detachment of
the National Guard of Georgia, under the command of Captain G. Karkarashvili,
accompanied by several armoured vehicles. The Supreme Council of Abkhazia
(including Georgian deputies, supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia) almost
unanimously demanded that this detachment leave the territory of the republic
forthwith. The anger of the government and multi-ethnic population of
Abkhazia was caused in particular by the transfer of weapons and several
units of the BMP Assault Battalion Airborne-troops of Russia, which had been
placed in Sukhum (in the district of Majak [Lighthouse]) shortly before the
collapse of the Soviet Union. [7]
Today it is clear that all this took place against the background of the Minsk summit of the CIS, and the Russian leadership
decided to show Georgia
some "carrot" in the form of several BMPs.
Under
the February agreements, on 2 March in Moscow
there were very important meetings with Shevardnadze. The negotiations were
carried out by Defence Minister L. Sharashenidze and T. Kitovani, a member of
the Military Council of Georgia, who, along with Prime Minister T. Sigua and
unlike Dzh. Ioseliani, were not eager to invite the ex-Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR to Georgia as
head of state. However, the situation changed after a five-hour conversation
between Shevardnadze and Kitovani. Then a two-hour interview took place with
the Minister of Defence of the Russian
Federation, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of
the CIS, E. Shaposhnikov, and the Russian
Ambassador to the U.S. Vladimir Lukin. Another meeting was held with the head
of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia, E. Primakov. To all these
people Shevardnadze gave a firm promise to join the CIS in the near future. In
fact, this was the main condition lay down by the Russian leadership on
Shevardnadze.
A participant in these
important negotiations in Moscow
on 2 March 1992, Georgian Defence Minister L. Sharashenidze disappointedly
later noted:
"These talks foreshadowed many positive changes in Russian-Georgian
relations. Unfortunately, the reality turned out to be different.
“On 7 March, E. A. Shevardnadze arrived in Tbilisi. On arrival, he stressed in his
statements that Georgia
would follow a pro-Western course, that the emphasis in foreign policy would
be, above all, predicated on a strategic partnership with the United States, and that Georgia would
not join the CIS. It is not hard to imagine what kind of reaction this had in
Russia
and the other CIS countries," [8] L.Sharashenidze rightly concludes.
In late March 1992, the Minister of Defence of Georgia met in the Kremlin the
vice-president of Russia,
A. Rutskim, and then Navy Commander Col. Gen. E. Podkolzinym; however, the
promise to help in the construction of the Georgian armed forces was
suspended. The question of entry into the CIS remained open.
Georgia
sought to obtain the necessary weapons, but, by the Tashkent Agreement of 15
May 1992, only members of the CIS had the right to a military quota. For this
reason and because of the continuing war in South Ossetia, Tbilisi authorities could not qualify for 220
tanks, artillery systems, combat aircraft and helicopters. After the Dagomys
meeting and the decision on the cessation of hostilities in South
Ossetia, as well as the "Communiqué" of 24 June 1992
[9], Yeltsin and Shevardnadze agreed on further cooperation. As a result of
the "Dagomys Accord", the Russian leadership proceeded to violate
the Tashkent Agreement and, by way of an exception, provided Georgia with
tanks, aircraft and other weapons. The process of transferring the military
equipment and ammunition was completed in late July-early August 1992. Shevardnadze
once again assured Yeltsin that he would enter the CIS, as over a matter of 2
or 3 days he would solve the problem of Abkhazia "with little
blood."
Yeltsin supported Georgia's
leader until 25 September 1992. On this day, Eduard Shevardnadze at a meeting
of the UN General Assembly in New York asked
for help from the West, blaming Russia. This speech and his
insulting remarks with reference to the Abkhazians confused many in the hall
of the UN. Yeltsin was annoyed and in his circle, not without malice, noted:
"Shevardnadze imagines himself president of a great power but in fact
does not even head a banana republic ..." [10]
On the same day, 25 September, the oppositional Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation adopted a resolution "On the situation in the North Caucasus
in connection with the events in Abkhazia," in which it demanded the
immediate withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia and restoration of the
legitimate government.
From New York Shevardnadze flew to Moscow,
but Yeltsin received him very coldly. The Russian leadership were convinced
that the Tbilisi
leader had no intention of joining the CIS. Failure to evaluate properly this
important geopolitical factor led to the realisation by Yeltsin and Defence
Minister P. Grachëv that Shevardnadze and Kitovani were only trying to take
advantage of Russian military support. Thus, from the end of September 1992,
the position of the Russian élite towards Tbilisi was not that simple.
After the defeat of the Georgian troops in Gagra in October 1992, the
Abkhazian authorities took control of the north-western border with Russia at the
R. Psou. The situation at this time changed radically. The Georgian State
Council adopted a resolution "On the transition to active military
operations in Abkhazia." In this regard, two months after the war began,
on 22 October, General Sharashenidze sent Shevardnadze a detailed note and
proposals on the military question. [11] He warned the head of Georgia of
the consequences that might occur as a result of taking hasty and not
properly assessed measures. I will not detail the nature of this interesting
note with its realistic view of the new balance of power, I shall note only
that the author says: "Today, the situation has changed in favour of the
enemy," and for him "there is being created an offensive
group." He speaks of the possible encirclement of Sukhum and a strike on
Ochamchira. "The forces of the Georgian side are scattered formations,
hastily equipped and there is no unified command," remarked
Sharashenidze. He suggests: "To abandon the planned offensive in the
next 2-3 days in the direction of Gudauta and Tkvarchal, and to focus on the
defence of Sukhum". Among the various recommendations, there are also
some that are quite unexpected, with an environmental slant, "together
with scientists from the Georgian
Technical University
and other research-centres, urgently to prepare the use of directed
explosions, [with the aim of] creating artificial mud-flows in the valleys
(in the case of necessity)."
As a result, notes L. Sharashenidze, though scheduled for the end of October
1992, the "large-scale offensive was rejected", and also never
implemented were the proposed measures.
As is well-known, on 27 July 1993,
a ceasefire-agreement was signed in Sochi. Sharashenidze participated in the
meeting in the capacity of chief military adviser to the Ministry of Defence
of Georgia.
"I would like to draw attention to the fact,” he wrote, “that
Shevardnadze then missed a great opportunity to use Russian troops to prevent
the loss of Abkhazia". [12]
About what kind of chance in July 1993 was general L. Sharashenidze speaking?
It turns out that the Russian side then offered to keep in Sukhum two Russian
divisions, transfer the headquarters of the Joint Control Commission from Sochi to Sukhum and to
bring into the city a reinforced battalion with 30 BMPs.
According to the general, these were real actions that could have saved
Sukhum. However, the Georgian side rejected the proposals. "Shevardnadze
should not have allowed this," concludes L. Sharashenidze. [13]
The next tragic mistake by Shevardnadze the general considered to be the
events of the second half of September 1993. Judging by this eloquent
testimony, it is evident that Abkhazia at that time was on the verge of some
disaster. Behind our backs, outright trading was going on: Georgia was
again invited to join the CIS in exchange for Abkhazia. The covert struggle
and hidden agendas of the great powers only by a miracle failed to produce
the desired results. Objective circumstances were above some subjective
aspirations. However, judge for yourselves. I cite almost in full the
testimony of the eyewitness of those tumultuous events:
"And one of his (Shevardnadze’s – S. L.) big mistakes was this,” L.
Sharashenidze notes. “On 16 September, Defence Minister G. Karkarashvili and
I were in Moscow
with Russian Defence Minister P. S. Grachëv. The meeting went well. Grachëv
promised weapons, equipment, and high-level cooperation in the implementation
by the Abkhazian side of the ceasefire-conditions. Karkarashvili in the
evening flew to Tbilisi, but I stayed in Moscow to prepare with Colonel-General Galkin the
position on the status of the Russian troops in Georgia. By this time I had been
appointed Deputy Defence Minister for relations with the Russian Army.
“On 17 September, the Abkhazian side treacherously violated the Sochi
armistice-agreement,” continues Sharashenidze, “and started military
operations in the direction of Ochamchira, and, one day later, in the
direction of Sukhum too ...
“Shevardnadze called Moscow and asked me to contact P. S. Grachëv in order
for him to take measures and stop the Abkhazian side. On this day, Grachëv
was in hospital, but later in the evening, with the head of the Main
Operations Directorate, he flew to Adler, where, on 18 September, he had a
meeting with Shevardnadze, Minister of Defence G. Karkarashvili, and Minister
of Security I. Batiashvili, at which Grachëv proposed to introduce into
Georgia two airborne-paratroop divisions, the Pskov and the Tula, introducing
one of them later to Azerbaijan – they had the agreement of the Azerbaijani
side.
“To this proposal G.
Karkarashvili reacted very painfully by saying that this would be a new occupation
of Georgia,
and he would resign, but Shevardnadze was silent, thus refusing to consent to
the deployment of Russian troops. P. S. Grachëv told me so himself in the
presence of the Chief of the General Staff M. P. Kolesnikov, upon his return
from Adler,” notes Sharashenidze. “…I immediately called Shevardnadze and
told him about this; he told me to fly immediately to Sukhum with our
prepared project for the status of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus.
“Late at night on 19 September, I flew to the besieged city, where in the
suburbs street-battles were underway. There was no unified authority ...
“I went to E. A. Shevardnadze after midnight and told him about the project
on the status of Russian troops in Georgia
that had been agreed with the Russian side and asked him to accept the
proposal of P. S. Grachëv for introduing into Georgia two divisions and also
entry into the CIS. ‘Let’s wait a couple of days,’ Shevardnadze replied.
“Three days passed, and, on 23 September, Shevardnadze announces his
agreement to introduce the paratroop-divisions into Abkhazia and requests an
urgent call to P. S. Grachëv to tell him about this. ‘But regarding entry
into the CIS, let’s wait a little bit,’ Shevardnadze told me.
“It was late, and we didn’t succeed in calling Grachëv; I went to the chief
of the General Staff M. P. Kolesnikov, who, after listening to me, said: ‘The
train has departed – we cannot move a single soldier anywhere,’ as, on 21
September, the well-known events at the White House had begun (the confrontation
between Khasbulatov and Yeltsin) ... Thus was missed another chance not to
lose Abkhazia and thousands of lives.
“On the 24th, with the agreement of Shevardnadze on the project for the
status of Russian troops in Georgia, I flew to Moscow and, on the same day,
met the Chief of the General Staff M. P. Kolesnikov and handed him a letter
addressed to P. S. Grachëv." [14]
In this letter of 24 September, General L. Sharashenidze, on behalf of E.
Shevardnadze, asked the Minister of Defence for Russia to return to the
earlier plan of 17 September 1993 that had been rejected by Tbilisi and to
begin its urgent implementation by the Russian army in order to stop the
‘bloodshed in Abkhazia’. [15]
However, the train had in actuality already departed.
Despite this, E. Shevardnadze, on 26
September 1993, addressed a letter to Boris Yeltsin, V. Chernomyrdin, and P.
Grachëv. In it, for the first time, the head of Georgia openly declares his
readiness to join the CIS. Interestingly, this historical document was sent
from Sukhum, where Shevardnadze found himself at the time as a political
hostage. Having fallen into a trap and being in a real nightmare, he could
not have dreamed that, like a prisoner, he would be pleading with the Russian
government to save not only Georgia
but also his own life.
"In Sukhum a catastrophic situation has been created; there is a real
the danger of the town falling,” declares Shevardnadze the day before the
liberation of the capital of Abkhazia. “There are hand-to-hand battles in the
streets; hundreds of innocent people are being killed.
“The only salvation now lies in the immediate involvement by way of
peacekeeping troops of part of the paratroops stationed in Georgia.
“This seems the only way to prevent an even greater tragedy. Speed of action
is everything -- tomorrow will be too late, because today, in these hours and
minutes, the fate of the country is being decided.
“Based on the above, I earnestly beseech you, Boris, to save Georgia.
“I am telling you, if this now has any meaning, that I have taken the
decision on Georgia’s
entry into the Commonwealth of Independent States. We agree on the
introduction into the conflict-zone of the military units proposed by General
Pavel Grachëv at the meeting in Sochi.
“I ask you to take the decision without delay. This is the last hope of
myself and of my people.
“With respect and hope,
“E. Shevardnadze."
But there was no reaction to these sobs.
There is no doubt that
the events and the outcome of the war would have been totally different, if Georgia from
the beginning (from February-March 1992) had entered the CIS.
Contrary to the various plans and circumstances, Abkhazia emerged victorious
from this unequal battle. Good luck and chance both smiled on us: the
Abkhazian offensive (16-30 September 1993) almost exactly coincided with the
Russian crisis (21 September–4 October), which ended in Moscow with tank-fire unleashed upon the
parliament. Thus, Russia
was experiencing its own developing problems, and, in this turmoil, when Yeltsin
was fighting for power, he had no time for Shevardnadze, who was suffering
the most genuine misfortune in besieged Sukhum. [16]
Caught in a bind already after the defeat in Abkhazia, Shevardnadze flew to Moscow. On 8 October
1993, Yeltsin had a meeting with the presidents of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia. The
next day, 9 October, Georgia
joined the CIS, Russia and
Georgia signing an
agreement on Russian military bases in Georgia, including Poti. The
Russian army took control of the Samtredia-Poti-Tbilisi stretch of the
railway. [17]
"That which we did not do in a timely manner,” lamented Sharashenidze,
“we did after losing thousands of people and our territorial integrity".
[18]
Abkhazia thus gained de facto independence, and Georgia at the time returned to
the Russian sphere of influence.
It would be wrong to assume that E. Shevardnadze did not understand the
consequences of his obstinacy on the issue of the CIS. Of course, as a
politician, he deliberately chose to take that risk.The question is, why? Because
Shevardnadze had long been tied through serious obligations to the government
of the United States,
which took the decision to return him to Georgia,
having enlisted the support of Moscow.
Of such stratagems the ingenuous General L. Sharashenidze apparently had no
idea. In this regard, attention is drawn to another eloquent but little known
fact. It turns out that, already in February 1992, in the very month
that Sharashenidze spoke at the Minsk CIS summit, Shevardnadze immediately
left for the United States.
During this visit, he signed with the company «Brock Group Ltd" a
protocol on the strategic concept of the economic revival of Georgia,
including expansion of the network of oil-terminals on the Black Sea, the
reconstruction of the sea-ports of Poti and Batumi, the transformation of
Batumi airport into an international terminal ... [19]
Worthy of particular note is the fact that, at that time, Shevardnadze was
not the head of Georgia [with the authority] to be signing any documents at
all, let alone one on a protocol of international order, but, behind the
scenes, the world had already reached its own solution to this problem. The
ex-Minister of the Soviet Union was able to secure the political and
diplomatic support of Washington.
Thus did Shevardnadze become involved in the great western game around the
newly discovered rich deposits of oil in Azerbaijan. This was the prelude
to the laying of the future Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which bypassed Russia and
slotted into the strategic plans of the West – to gain direct access to
Caspian energy-reserves, which was for the first time officially announced in
1994.
Such far-reaching goals, of course, did not fit the Russian project (to tie Georgia in to
the CIS). This is despite the fact that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker
declared: Russia's policy
in the early 90's followed the lead of U.S. foreign policy. However, the
administration of Boris Yeltsin, under pressure from patriotic forces,
sometimes allowed itself some obstinacy, especially in the matter of its Near
Abroad. Shevardnadze did not consider this and relied excessively on the United States
and the West in general, not wishing to reckon with the Russian factor. Such
demonstrative behaviour irritated both Yeltsin, the military, and Parliament.
As a result, the over-confidence of Shevardnadze was punished, and Georgia suffered a collapse ...
As for the coups d'etat in Azerbaijan
and Georgia
against elected presidents Elchibey and Gamsakhurdia, it was as if they had
been unnoticed by the international community. These coups, according to
Belgian researchers Eric Remacle and Olivier Paye, “were simply acceptable
for the great powers, and especially for Russia". [20]
In this connection, the saying of the ousted president Zviad Gamsakhurdia is
of interest. "You could say,” he declared, “that in Georgia the
military coup was effected from across the ocean with the personal
involvement of Baker and with the blessing of Bush". [21]
The Russian leadership did not at that time remain on the sidelines, placing
military-technical and financial support in the hands of the rebels [22], and
standing behind them in the wings with his American friends was Shevardnadze.
He rendered them great services relating primarily to the collapse of the
Soviet Union, unjustified deference at the time of the collapse of the GDR
and the reunification of Germany,
hasty withdrawal of Soviet troops, transfer to the Americans of 50 thousand
square kilometers of an area of the Bering Sea
rich in biological and energy-resources, etc. That is why Western leaders
welcomed the return of Shevardnadze to Tbilisi.
Georgia immediately
emerged from international isolation when more than 30 countries over a short
period recognized it as an independent republic, whilst the U.S. and Canada were willing to provide
large loans. Moreover, despite the ongoing war in South Ossetia, Georgia, on
24 March 1992, was admitted to the CSCE (now OSCE), and, on 31 July, two
weeks before the war against Abkhazia, the United Nations. As can be seen
from these examples, a cynical policy of "double standards" by the
leading Western countries found its own vivid expression.
__________________________
This article was published by ApsnyPress and is translated from Russian. [К 20-летию начала войны Грузии против Абхазии Станислав Лакоба ]
http://abkhazworld.com/articles/conflict/912-on-the-20th-anniversary-of-the-start-of-georgias-war-against-abkhazia.html
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