Liana Kvarchelia, Deputy Director of the Center for Humanitarian Programs in Abkhazia
Current state of Abkhazia’s external relations
The year 2013 marks 20 years of Abkhaz statehood. Without going into
the details of the contradictions in international law, the
constitutional framework, and the
de facto consequences of the collapse of the USSR for its former constituent republics and autonomous entities (and the
Realpolitik interests behind the process of recognition of the new post-Soviet republics), the key factor in the
de facto independence
of Abkhazia was the 1992–1993 Georgian-Abkhaz war. Up until 2008, the
Abkhaz based their arguments for independence on conflicts of law
related to different historical periods, including the creation and
collapse of the USSR. Today, the international legitimacy of the Abkhaz
state is being linked with the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence by
the Russian Federation in 2008. Subsequent recognition over the next
four years by a further five states – which, with the possible exception
of Venezuela, are extreme lightweights in the global conjuncture – has
not achieved widespread external legitimation of Abkhazia and the
recognition process is currently stagnating.
This raises the question of what the components are of the current
status quo and what the prospects are for changing it in favour of wider
international recognition of Abkhazia.
Abkhazia currently exists, as it were, in two dimensions. In one respect, Abkhazia is a
de jure
recognised state and an actor in official interstate (bilateral)
relations. This dimension is limited due to the partial nature of
Abkhazia’s recognition: just six states have recognised Abkhazia’s
independence. Moreover, only one of these six states – Russia, on whose
southern borders Abkhazia is located – is an influential international
player and a regional power. Russia provides Abkhazia with military
security guarantees, significant economic assistance and has a real
influence on the situation both in Abkhazia itself and in the region.
The West maintains a policy of partial isolation towards Abkhazia.
In the other dimension, Abkhazia
de jure is not considered a
sovereign entity, since it is considered to be an integral part of
Georgia and is not a subject of international relations. This dimension
does not reflect the true state of affairs, given that Abkhazia is
actually not dependent on Georgia: Georgia does not exercise control
over its territory and does not participate in its administration,
although it does influence the international conjuncture in relation to
Abkhazia.
The status quo under which these two dimensions have co-existed since
2008 has remained more or less stable. Moreover, despite some negative
trends, this status quo has not been seriously undermined by the
propaganda war over the events of 2008. Nor has it been critically
undermined by the format of the Geneva talks where the participants’
status has been reduced to that of “experts”, or by the string of
international resolutions on the so-called “occupied territories”.
However, any developments in the region that affect the interests of
the major players and are directly or indirectly related to Abkhazia
will inevitably lead to a collision between these two realities and
force the parties to find a compromise within the limits of what each
finds acceptable. For example, the 2011 Russia-Georgia agreement –
signed over Russia’s membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) –
required serious concessions from Georgia. However, it is unlikely that
the Georgian administration would have made these concessions had it not
been for pressure from Georgia’s main partner, the United States.
Russia was also forced to resort to watered-down formulations which did
not directly question the independence of Abkhazia (which Russia has
recognised), but also allowed the Georgian side to sign the document
which was of such importance for Moscow. The Abkhaz side has apparently
not been involved in the consultations, which directly concerned its
borders. It was only able to declare that it would not allow
international observers onto its territory under this Russian-Georgian
agreement.
Similar situations are bound to arise with other projects,
particularly if they directly affect the territory of Abkhazia. These
include, for example, the idea to reinstate the section of the South
Caucasus railway that passes through Abkhaz territory. Even if
Azerbaijan’s opposition to the reinstatement of a railway linking Russia
and Armenia is overcome, the parties will have to find a formula that
satisfies Abkhazia in particular, since it is the most vulnerable player
due to the partial nature of its recognition and the consequences this
entails.
Are new relations with Georgia possible?
In the very first days after coming to power in Georgia, the new
State Minister for Reintegration, Paata Zakareishvili, attempted to
remove the taboo subjects that currently exist within Georgian politics:
exploring bolder ideas such as a bilateral agreement with Abkhazia on
the non-use of force; a review of the law on the “occupied territories”
to facilitate direct contacts between Abkhazia and Europe; the
reinstatement of the railway line through Abkhazia; the renaming of the
Ministry of “Reintegration”, etc. These ideas are far from popular even
with other departments of the new Georgian government, let alone with
the opposition. Conflicts are a political resource, routinely used in
domestic politics, driving entirely reasonable ideas into the
Procrustean bed of populism. Given the current highly competitive
political environment in Georgia, the Georgian authorities are likely to
find it difficult to adopt a pragmatic position on Abkhazia without
external support and clear messages from Western partners to the
Georgian opposition. It is also clear that, in order to obtain that
support, the new team must overcome the deficit of trust of the Western
partners; this is likely to take some time.
In any case, the key point is that Georgia’s ruling elite itself
needs to make a clear choice in relations with Abkhazia to reflect the
new realities. The initial impression given was that despite political
bickering within the ruling coalition, its most liberal wing was
inclined to extend its understanding of the “de-isolation” of Abkhazia
to include not only contacts with Georgia, but also direct contacts
between Sukhum and the West. If so, the coercion and the post-August
bogus “soft power” exercised by President Saakashvili may well have been
replaced by a genuine “soft power” aimed at gradually winning over the
Abkhaz to Georgia’s side by removing the barriers to Abkhazia’s contacts
with the outside world. This would involve Georgia being as open as
possible for the citizens of Abkhazia, whilst maintaining the political
aim of reintegration.
However, these new and some revived old ideas were presented to the
public by Zakareishvili packaged within the notion of the “occupied
territories”. The constant use by the new authorities of the term
“occupied territories” was initially interpreted as paying lip service
to “political correctness” in relation to the Georgian political
community. Nevertheless, it quickly became clear that the Georgian “red
lines” do not include full, independent contacts between Abkhazia and
the outside world. The arguments of the Georgian authorities that real
security and development can only be ensured for Abkhazia through
rapprochement with Georgia are unrealistic, since they do not take into
consideration the perception of threat as understood by the Abkhaz side.
If Tbilisi again views the de-isolation of Abkhazia solely in terms of
an inevitable and undeviating reintegration with Georgia (even a renewed
Georgia), then there is no realistic prospect of Abkhazia ever
seriously opening up to the outside world (except to Russia).
The change in regimes in Tbilisi does not alter the desire of the
Abkhaz to build their own independent state. If the new Georgian
authorities resort to the old approaches, the current status quo is
likely to remain. If the Tbilisi authorities realise that counting on
de-isolation to win over the Abkhaz to Georgia’s side has failed, they
may be content to relinquish responsibility for taking decisions on this
complex conflict and concentrate instead on domestic issues within
Georgia. “Turning a blind eye” to contacts, particularly between Europe
and Abkhazia, might involve Georgia partially acting against its
self-serving policy. However, one desirable outcome for Georgia might
well be that the diversification of Abkhazia’s economic and political
contacts could serve, to some extent, to balance the presence of
external players in the region.
A more realistic, status-neutral position towards Abkhazia – at least
as a party to the conflict and in relation to an agreement on the
non-use of force – would increase the likelihood of cooperation on areas
of mutual interest. Such areas include the involvement of Abkhazia in
regional or even bilateral, mutually beneficial economic initiatives.
While there may be some limited opportunities for interaction over
transport, trade or energy, it must be borne in mind that any decisions
by the Abkhaz side will be carefully weighed up against the potential
risks. The approach adopted by Georgia – whether the current one based
on the idea of “occupation”, or possible neutrality over the status of
Abkhazia, or even recognition of the republic’s independence (which
naturally Abkhazia would prefer) – will determine the degree of
Abkhazia’s openness to interaction of this type. In other words, from
the Abkhaz perspective interaction could only take place where the
format, scale and conditions exclude any threat to Abkhazia’s military
and political security. In this sense, economic incentives are of
limited value in persuading Abkhazia to make compromises over its
political status.
This also applies to the European idea of giving Abkhazia the
opportunity to enjoy the fruits of the EU-Georgia Free Trade Agreement
and Visa Waiver Scheme currently under negotiation. There is a
widespread view among the international community that economic and
trade cooperation between Georgia and Abkhazia, as well as contacts in
other areas, could be an effective instrument for reconciling the two
peoples and ultimately restoring Georgia’s “territorial integrity”.
However, it is the idea of “reintegration” that repulses the Abkhaz side
and forces it to go down the more obvious and in some ways easier route
of blocking any initiatives launched by Georgia or indeed its allies.
One example of this are the recent tendencies that might potentially
lead to further reducing the international presence in Abkhazia; these
tendencies are likely to damage not so much Abkhazia’s economic
interests, but its political objectives of overcoming international
inertia in relation to itself.
Western approaches to Abkhazia
While we acknowledge that there are subtle differences between the
European and American approaches to the conflict, these two major
international actors nevertheless operate on the same basis. Abkhazia
and its claims for widespread international recognition are viewed by
the international community through the prism of the West’s relations
with Russia. The coalition government headed by Bidzina Ivanishvili came
to power on a platform of restoring Georgia’s relations not only with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also with Russia. This has generated, on
the one hand, inflated expectations within the international community
regarding the prospects of achieving a settlement of the conflict. On
the other hand, it has raised some concerns that Georgia might deviate
from its Euro-Atlanticist direction. These concerns might, in certain
situations, force the West to try to de-link the settlement of
territorial disputes from Georgia’s membership of NATO. Depending on
Georgia’s position, this might result in the continuation of the policy
of isolation and Abkhazia’s steady drift towards a
de facto
Russian protectorate (which is more likely) or a gradual, lengthy
process of conditional recognition of Abkhazia. In the latter case,
these conditions could include a significant international presence in
Abkhazia, a resolution of the refugee issue (partial return,
compensation for losses of property, including in exchange for return),
democratisation in all areas in accordance with international standards,
etc. The recent vote to give Palestine observer status at the UN has
shown that a line has not yet been drawn under the process of
recognition of new states. Moreover, whatever Georgia’s motives for
voting in favour of Palestine’s membership, it does to some extent
reflect the understanding within the international community of the
inevitability of certain processes. In this context, it is impossible to
sustain the argument that the “dismemberment” of Georgia is unlawful
given Georgia’s genesis in the collapse of the USSR, the recognition of
Kosovo and a set of other states, as well as the recent events around
Palestine.
In the case of Abkhazia, however, both the US and the EU, given the
peripheral nature of the Georgian-Abkhaz issue on the international
agenda, are likely in the foreseeable future to prefer to maintain the
existing status quo. It is conceivable that they will use this status
quo in the coming years as a “stick” in their relations with Russia and
leave it to Turkey to play the part of a more flexible player in
relations with Abkhazia. The latest evidence of such flexibility is the
partnership agreement concluded in November 2012 between the Abkhaz
capital and the Turkish city of Side. This was followed by a visit to
the Abkhaz capital by a group of Turkish entrepreneurs and
representatives of the local administration from a Turkish city.
Another possibility is that Europe itself will finally draw lessons
from its failed attempt at “engagement without recognition” and will not
merely formulate but actually implement initiatives on the de-isolation
of Abkhazia for its own sake and not solely in terms of its impact on
conflict. The formula “interaction/engagement without recognition”,
although originally well-intentioned, has been compromised by its
capture and mothballing by the former Georgian administration. If
lessons are learnt and Europe has sufficient interest in the region, new
initiatives could emerge by which Abkhazia can communicate directly
with European countries. However, if Europe’s principal aim as a near
neighbour is not stability and democracy in the region, but to force out
Russia through a reconciliation between the Abkhaz and Georgians and
the return of Abkhazia to Georgia, there will inevitably be even more
radical reductions in what is already merely a symbolic international
presence in Abkhazia.
The new Abkhaz approach to international institutions
The aforementioned trend within Abkhazia towards a tougher stance
over contacts with the West has a number of facets. On the one hand, it
is reactive, intended to persuade the international community to change
its current approach to Abkhazia – whereby Abkhazia is considered a part
of Georgia – particularly as this approach has hardened since 2008, as
manifested, for example, in Abkhazia being stripped of its status as a
party in the talks. The Medvedev-Sarkozy plan is now spent and the time
has come for a discussion of a new format for the Geneva talks.
The assistance provided by Europe in particular is limited in scale
and sometimes symbolic. There are no significant development programmes;
the emphasis is more on humanitarian programmes. The EU links the idea
of de-isolation exclusively with the resolution of the conflict. All
this is seen in Abkhazia as a discriminatory approach and increases
distrust of Western institutions.
Abkhazia’s introduction of more formal procedures for communicating
with the outside world – which replaced the previously more flexible
interaction that reflected the political aspect of the international
presence in Abkhazia – may also mean that the current administration no
longer sees cooperation with international organisations as a way to
create a more favourable international climate for state-building in
Abkhazia. Unfortunately, attempts by individual Western institutions and
organisations to engage coincided with a peak in general fatigue and
frustration over the EU’s inaction over Abkhazia. Nevertheless, the fact
that government bodies are currently discussing the introduction of a
visa waiver for foreign citizens (although for the time being only in
relation to the Russia-Abkhaz border) and that Abkhazia’s president has
repeatedly suggested that the international representatives consider
large-scale investments in Abkhazia may be evidence that Abkhazia is
still trying to find rules of the game that are acceptable.
The new Abkhaz approach also appears, to some extent, to take into
account trends in Russia as well as Russian concerns about previously
declared ideas of an Abkhaz “multi-vector” policy. Such a policy was
misinterpreted by many and portrayed as a withdrawal from its alliance
with Russia. In fact, since it is in Abkhazia’s long-term interests to
strengthen its sovereignty by increasing its international legitimacy,
the Abkhaz side under the previous administration had made some efforts
to expand its international contacts while maintaining and deepening its
partnership with Russia. In terms of the international presence in
Abkhazia, there appears to be a clash between, firstly, the joint
interest of Abkhazia and Russia in dispelling the myth of the
“occupation” of Abkhazia, which cannot be achieved if Abkhazia remains
cut off from the West; secondly, there are Russia’s concerns that
Abkhazia’s loyalty might waver; and thirdly, Abkhazia has concerns that
relations might be put at risk with its sole ally, guarantor of security
and principal donor. Moreover, Abkhazia is attempting to balance
promoting its interests over contentious Russian-Abkhaz issues (the
issue of the church, the demarcation of the border around the village of
Aigba, the unification of the North Caucasus with the South through the
Kodor Gorge, property issues, etc.) with a rather rhetorical toughness
towards Western organisations. However, the Abkhaz legitimate demand
that the Western institutions respect their right to self-determination
is not matched by a corresponding openness or effort to overcome inertia
in relation to Abkhazia. If requirements for relations with
international organisations are made too tough, it might lead to the
marginalisation of Abkhazia by international institutions rather than a
change in Western approaches. Figures in the Abkhaz establishment, who
have so far enjoyed a reputation as sophisticated politicians, need to
strike a balance to prevent Abkhazia being seen as a closed society and
being ignored on the international stage.
Relations with Russia
Relations between Abkhazia and Russia are based on formal legal
equivalence but are in practice asymmetrical. This asymmetry results not
just from the disparities in the economic and political weight of the
two parties, but also from the fact that Abkhazia has no viable
alternative to these relations given the lack of widespread
international recognition. While the Abkhaz are sensitive to any signs
that Abkhazia’s sovereignty might be infringed, Russia is still closer
to the Abkhaz in terms of language and culture than the West. Moreover,
communication with the West has been restricted since the collapse of
the USSR to discussions around the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, on which
the West’s position was prejudiced from the start. In Abkhazia (and
indeed in Georgia itself outside Tbilisi), perceptions of Russia are not
negative as in most of the West.
The prospect of an easing in Russian-Georgian relations following the
change in government in Georgia in the run-up to the 2014 Winter
Olympics in Sochi is no longer the cause of concern in Abkhazia as it
was before 2008. This is because the Russian administration, with its
aspirations for the return of Russia’s superpower status, could not
withdraw its recognition of Abkhazia without a substantial loss of face
regarding, in the first place, its own electorate. Given Russia’s
interest in reinstating railway communications with Armenia and other
potential projects in the region, it could well be that one of Russia’s
partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) might grant
Abkhazia recognition as an incentive.
There is a growing realisation within Abkhaz society itself that if
Abkhazia’s sovereignty is to be maintained, it needs to become a viable
state. Similarly, unless its economy develops, the country risks
becoming a region reliant on subsidies. This can only be achieved by
Russian assistance being transformed from contributions to the
infrastructure into investment in the economy.
Topics for discussion
The following questions represent key topics for discussion regarding Abkhazia’s future relations and status.
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of Abkhazia’s current international position?
- Under what circumstances could Abkhazia gain broader recognition by CIS countries?
- Is the new Georgian approach fully formed? Will it contain a “window of opportunity” for Abkhazia?
- What would Georgia and Abkhazia gain from mutual recognition and what are the risks?
- Is the new Abkhaz approach to international bodies likely to be
self-imposed isolation or the reconfiguration of external contacts?
- Is the future of the Geneva process likely to entail two processes (Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian) instead of one?
- Can recognition by European states be achieved without any link to conflict resolution?
- Which is more important in terms of recognition: quality or quantity?
http://www.international-alert.org/content/conflicts-and-external-relations-english-lk
Детский
Фонд Абхазии выражает глубокое
возмущение в связи с тем, что для участия детского танцевального ансамбля
”Абаза“ в международном детском фестивале,
который будет проводиться 23 апреля 2013
в Турецкой Республике в память о
проведении первого Великого национального собрания Турции, были поставлены неприемлемые
условия, носящие политический характер,
и абхазский детский ансамбль не сможет принять участие наравне с другими детьми мира в
этом празднике.
